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Secure computing is gaining importance in recent times as computing capabili-
ty is increasingly becoming distributed and information is everywhere. Preven-
tion of piracy and digital rights management has become very important. In-
formation security is mandatory rather than an additional feature. Numerous 
software techniques have been proposed to provide certain level of copyright 
and intellectual property protection. Techniques like obfuscation attempt to 
transform the code into a form that is harder to reverse engineer. Tamper-
proofing causes a program to malfunction when it detects that it has been mod-
ified. Software watermarking embeds copyright notice in the software code to 
allow the owners of the software to assert their intellectual property rights. The 
software techniques discourage software theft, can trace piracy, prove owner-
ship, but cannot prevent copying itself. Thus, software based security firewalls 
and encryption is not completely safe from determined hackers. This necessi-
tates the need for information security at the hardware level, where secure pro-
cessors assume importance. In this dissertation, a detailed architecture and in-
struction set of the SCAN-Secure Processor is proposed. The SCAN-SP is a 




image compression, encryption, information hiding based on SCAN methodol-
ogy and biometric authentication based on Local Global Graph methodology. 
A SCAN based methodology for encryption and decryption of 32 bit instruc-
tions and data is proposed. The modules to support the new instructions are 
synthesized in reconfigurable logic and the results of FPGA synthesis are pre-
sented. The ultimate goal of the proposed work is a detailed study of the tra-
deoffs that exists between speed of execution and security of the processor. De-
signing a faster processor is not the goal of the proposed work, rather exploring 
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1 CHAPTER ONE 
Information security is perhaps one of the key responsibilities of mod-
ern software and hardware architects. The research on security is gaining im-
portance as the number of embedded, networked and distributed computing 
systems is increasing rapidly. Security critical systems require software appli-
cations to be run on secure processors that have capability to secure operations. 
In this scenario, an integration of technologies like cryptography, hardware 
design, software engineering and biometrics plays a definitive role in provid-
ing security to critical information. In this dissertation, we explore the design of 
a secure processor architecture, called the SCAN-SP. We provide a detailed 
analysis of the relevant issues in the processor design along with its perfor-
mance evaluation. We analyze the tradeoffs that exist between providing in-
creased security versus increased speed of execution. 
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter.2 offers a brief intro-
duction to secure computing along with a detailed a survey of the current se-
cure processor architectures in industry and academia. In chapter.3 we present 
the new SCAN-SP architecture and the new instruction set. We present the 
evaluation of the proposed SCAN-SP design with certain simulated benchmark 
applications. We further, present the design and integration of FPGA modules 
along with a new instruction set, to enable SCAN methodology based image 




a survey of current biometric methodologies and a comparative evaluation of 
the surveyed methodologies. Chapter.5 describes Local-Global graph metho-
dology based voice, iris and fingerprint biometric authentication along with 
FPGA implementation of critical sections of the LG graph methodology. We 
also present the new instruction set to enable biometric authentication. Chap-







2 CHAPTER TWO 
In this chapter a brief introduction to secure computing along with a 
detailed survey of the current secure processor architectures in industry and 
academia is presented. 
2.1 Secure Computing 
The secure computing model shown in Fig.2-1 is a single processor sys-
tem with external memory and peripherals. The processor is implemented on a 
single ship integrated circuit (IC) and is assumed to be trusted and protected 
from physical attacks i.e. its internal state cannot be tampered with or observed 
directly by physical means. The processor contains secret information such as a 
public key that identifies it and allows it to communicate securely with the out-
side world. The processor is protected by a tamper-sensing environment [2] 
[30]. 
The trusted computing base (TCB) consists of the processor chip and 
optionally some core parts of the operating system such as the security kernel. 
The processor is used in a multitasking environment, which uses virtual mem-
ory and runs mutually mistrusting processes. External memory and peripher-
als are assumed to be un-trusted; they may be observed and tampered with at 
will by an adversary. Additionally data values stored in off-chip memory are 
encrypted. The encryption and decryption of data values is done by a hard-




or between the cache and the CPU core.   
 
Fig. 2-1. Secure Computing Model 
If the crypto-engine or Encryption Decryption Unit (EDU) is placed be-
tween the cache and the external main memory as seen in Fig.2-2, encryption 
and decryption is done block wise, page wise or segment wise. This is because 
a cache miss causes flushing of the cache and filling the cache with new data. 
Since, data movement between the cache and the external main memory occurs 
page wise or segment wise, encryption and decryption is implemented by em-






Fig. 2-2. EDU between Cache and External Memory 
If the Encryption Decryption Unit is placed between the cache and the 
CPU core as seen in Fig.2-3, encryption and decryption is done instruction 
wise. Any branching in the instruction execution sequence requires the instruc-
tion to be fetched from the branched location in the cache. Therefore, the en-
cryption or decryption technique has to accommodate the discontinuities in 
program execution. A simple stream cipher may not be able to achieve the re-
quired encryption because of the jumps in program execution due to branch-
ing. Therefore each and every instruction may be encrypted as a separate enti-
ty, i.e. instruction wise encryption is implemented. In this case the cache con-
tains encrypted instructions, which are decrypted just before execution in the 
pipelined execution model. 
 




The TCB needs to ensure the integrity of memory accesses before it per-
forms any operation or stores data into the external memory space and thus 
memory integrity verification is required. Memory behaves like valid memory 
if the value the processor loads from a particular address is the most recent 
value that it has stored to that address [2]. Also the programs must be well-
written not to leak secrets via memory access patterns. 
2.2 Secure Processors 
In this section we offer a review of secure processor designs currently in 
the industry and the academia. The classification of secure processor designs is 
based on the location of the crypto-engine necessary to implement encryption 
or decryption of instructions and data. The crypto-engine can be placed on-
chip, in a single monolithic architecture or it can be placed off-chip, like an 
FPGA based co-processor. We also review hybrid techniques that combine on-
chip crypto-engine with off-chip co-processor to provide enhanced security. 
2.2.1 Monolithic Architecture 
In this section we offer a review of secure processor designs currently in 
the industry and the academia. The classification of secure processor designs is 
based on the location of the crypto-engine necessary to implement encryption 
or decryption of instructions and data. The crypto-engine can be placed on-
chip, in a single monolithic architecture or it can be placed off-chip, like an 
FPGA based co-processor. We also review hybrid techniques that combine on-




Bus encryption technique was first introduced by Best twenty five years 
ago [4] [5] [6] [2]. Best proposed to consider the CPU as secure and consequent-
ly all data and addresses are in decrypted form inside the CPU and encrypted 
outside the processor chip. A cipher unit is implemented on-chip and a secret 
cipher key is located in an on-chip register.  
Various patents exist in the industry. VLSI technology [7] [2] proposes 
an architecture where data transfers to and from the external memory is done 
page wise. All CPU requests are managed by a secure DMA unit and commu-
nications between external and internal memory use an encryption/decryption 
core using block cipher techniques which is robust. Since the operating system 
controls the DMA, this method is viable as long as the OS is trusted. 
General Instrument Corporation [8][2] proposed to encrypt the memory 
content with a triple DES (Data Encryption Standard) in block chaining mode 
and to offer the possibility to authenticate the data coming from external mem-
ory using a keyed hash algorithm. Cipher block chaining methodology is ro-
bust but has severe CPU performance degradation for random external memo-
ry accesses.  
Dallas Semiconductor proposed an architecture that implements 64 bit 
triple DES block cipher coupled with rapid “zeroization” of secure information 
as a tamper response to further strengthen the security feature [9], in their in-
dustrial product, DS5240.  The older version of their product DS5002FP was 
broken by the well known Markus G. Kuhn attack [29]. DS5002FP supported 





The Secure Blue secure processor [15] architecture proposed by IBM fa-
cilitates high volume Secure Socket Layer (SSL) Internet serving, scaling from 
thousands to millions of independently active SSL sessions. The Secure Blue 
architecture aims to offload SSL set-up protocol activity that is traditionally ex-
ecuted by dedicated co-processors to a scalable array of SSL handshake Proto-
col specific servers. Additionally, the actual encryption and decryption 
processing is offloaded as well to a dedicated and scalable array of In-Line En-
cryption Engines. But the In-Line Encryption Engine is architected such that 
requests and responses flowing to and from the transaction servers are in clear 
text. But this does not make the processor secure by itself, since the instructions 
being executed are not encrypted. 
The innovations of LaGrande Technology [37] from Intel include do-
main separation, protected execution, sealed storage, a trusted channel to 
graphics and input devices like mouse and keyboard, mechanisms for authen-
ticating the launch of a protected environment and attestation of platform iden-
tity. Extensions to the IA-32 architecture allow for the creation of multiple ex-
ecution environments, or partitions. This allows for the coexistence of a legacy 
partition and a protected partition. The basis of this protection lies with the 
TPM‟s (Trusted Platform Module) Storage Root Key (SRK), a public/private 
key pair. Even though the processor provides for secure execution of programs, 
the instructions by themselves are not encrypted. 




Broadcom is a single-chip, trusted platform solution capable of executing ap-
plication software in a secure environment. The BCM5890's secure memory 
access system allows application code to be encrypted and digitally signed 
prior to being stored in off-chip memory. The BCM5890 provides the user with 
two operating modes - secure and open mode. In secure mode, the application 
software has access to all the chip peripherals, while in open mode; access to 
secure peripherals is limited. Context information is securely managed when 
switching between operating modes. Specifications include 150 MHz operation 
and 16-KB data and instruction cache with one-time programmable hardware-
protected key storage and Secure Assurance Logic (SAL). 
The secure processor design based on Deep Code Scrambling approach 
involves XORing the 32-bit instruction and data path with a 32 bit XOR key. 
Multiple XOR keys can be used to secure multiple critical sections of the pro-
gram running on the CPU. The XOR key corresponding to that session can be 
stored on a special on chip register, accessible using a special instruction. This 
approach supports running of both encrypted and non-encrypted versions of 
the program in the same session using a special instruction to switch between 
the secure and normal execution modes. Since only the critical sections are en-
crypted in this approach, this method offers better performance as compared to 
other approaches. Jumps and branches during the encrypted sessions must be 
addressed carefully by the programmer and necessary compiler support is de-
sired in this approach. 




tures that include bus encryption. An internal permanent memory and logic 
control unit and pipelined triple Data Encryption Algorithm (DEA) block ci-
pher is proposed in the work titled “Enhancing Security in the Memory Man-
agement Unit” [10]. The security management unit and the internal permanent 
memory are added to an existing CPU core without significant loss of perfor-
mance. The deciphering cost can be kept under 2, 5 %, with 8 kB I-cache for the 
deepest pipeline and with 2 kB I-cache for the 4-stage pipeline (12-stage if pre-
diction is used). Thus, it is not necessary to design a special CPU core for this 
device, the software library can be preserved and the security management 
unit can be adapted to several CPU technologies. But memory operations 
(write operations) for smaller than block sizes, can degrade performance.   
The XOM (Execute Only Memory) [11] project uses a pipelined AES 
(Advanced Encryption Standard) block cipher unit. Though the cipher unit fea-
tures a low latency of 14 latency cycles, while maintaining a throughput of one 
encrypted/decrypted data per clock cycle, no specific benchmarking has been 
carried out since only latency does not inform about the overall system cost [2]. 
The decryption is carried after they are fetched from memory, and before they 
are used by the CPU. As a result, the lengthened critical path causes serious 
performance degradation. 
The AEGIS [12] project implements a cipher unit composed by a pipe-
lined AES (300,000) gates in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode. Since the CBC 
corresponds to the cache block size, it allows for random access to external 




the fetched instruction cannot be provided to the processor until the entire 
block is deciphered. By using Physical Random Functions, a way of protecting 
and sharing secrets is proposed. In this project the bus encryption engine is 
evaluated separately, therefore the given cost overhead in terms of perfor-
mance and silicon area is more detailed [2]. The major drawback is the heavy 
tradeoff between security and embedded constraints; estimated performance 
overhead introduced by the encryption engine is 25%. 
In the work titled “A Code Compression Method to Cope with Security 
Hardware Overheads, Computer Architecture and High Performance Compu-
ting” [13], a code compression method, the IBC-EI (Instruction Based Compres-
sion with Encryption and Integrity Checking) modified to provide integrity 
checking and encryption to secure processor memory transactions is presented. 
The principle is to keep the code compressed and ciphered in memory, thus 
reducing the memory footprint and providing more information of memory 
access. This methodology increases hardware complexity with increased inter-
nal memory requirements due to compression with encryption. 
The proponents of the work titled “Authentication Control Point and Its 
Implications For Secure Processor Design” [14], seek to explore the relationship 
between privacy and integrity protection in the context of modern out of order 
processor design, by evaluating different designs that integrate software de-
cryption and integrity verification into an out of order pipeline. The authors 
provide an in depth analysis of security and performance trade-offs and impli-




commit, authentication-then-write, authentication-then-fetch and authentica-
tion-then-commit + address obfuscation.  
In their work titled “Fast secure processor for inhibiting software piracy 
and tampering” [18] [20], the authors present a technique in which the crypto-
graphy computation is shifted off from the memory access critical path by us-
ing a different encryption scheme, namely “one-time pad” encryption, to pro-
duce the instructions and data cipher-text. With some additional on-chip sto-
rage, cryptography computations are carried in parallel with memory accesses, 
minimizing performance penalty. The authors claim that their technique re-
duces the performance overhead from 16.7% for critical path cryptography to 
1.28% for onetime pad cryptography. But the impact on the overall perfor-
mance in multi-task systems and context switching is not well addressed. Also 
the level of security achieved is not discussed in particular. 
In their article titled “Efficient memory integrity verification and en-
cryption for secure processors” [22], the authors propose a hardware mechan-
ism for memory integrity verification and encryption for single chip secure 
processors. Their encryption scheme uses onetime-pad encryption and time 
stamps, and overlaps the decryption computation from the corresponding data 
access, enabling the processor to overlap decryption computation with data 
access and hide most of the decryption latency. But the integrity verification 
mechanism offers significant performance advantages over existing ones only 
when the checks are infrequent as in grid computing applications. 




sistant software” [26] seeks to explore some of the potential security issues as 
one aims at processor designs to become more efficient, secure and flexible. 
The authors claim that even though security carries a performance penalty, it is 
possible to create a normal multi-tasking machine where nearly all applications 
can be run in XOM mode using compartments and session keys to isolate in-
dependent software applications running on the same processor. But the draw-
back is that the underlying hardware needs to support a unique private key, 
private memory and traps on cache misses. This leads to increased complexity 
and increased on-chip memory requirement. 
In general view, we see two representative designs depending on the 
on-chip positioning of the crypto-engine. The crypto-engine can be placed be-
tween the cache and the memory management unit and alternatively, it can be 
placed between the cache and the CPU. In the former case, encryption and de-
cryption is done block-wise or page-wise, i.e. the cache contains decrypted data 
and instructions, and in the latter case, decryption of instructions is imple-
mented as a pipeline stage in the instruction execution path, i.e. the instruction 
is decrypted just before it is decoded and data encrypted before it is stored on 
the on-chip cache. 
2.2.2 Co-processor based Architecture 
In “Single-chip FPGA implementation of a cryptographic co-processor” 
[27], the authors present an implementation of a symmetric key crypto system 
(AES), a Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) and a method for providing digital sig-




linx virtex-2000E FPGA. A typical application would be as a co-processor for 
accelerating cipher operations in the TLS and IPSec protocols. The authors 
claim that the generic communicating interface to the design allows for the ad-
dition of new ciphers to the architecture without significant modifications. 
Proposed future work for this implementation involves adding a pseudo ran-
dom number generator (PRNG) based on a hash algorithm to the system, 
which is currently not implemented. 
On similar lines in “A reconfigurable public-key cryptography copro-
cessor” [28], the authors propose a RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
(ECC) co-processor based on Montgomery algorithm with reconfigurable cha-
racteristic. In this work, a new scalable and unified coprocessor for both RSA 
and ECC based on Montgomery algorithm is proposed. The coprocessor can 
perform the modular multiplication of RSA and point multiplication of ECC. It 
can implement modular multiplication with the bit length from 32 to 512, and 
point multiplication of ECC with the bit length from 32 to 256 without any 
modification for the hardware architecture. 
In “A design of hardware cryptographic co-processor” [29], the authors 
present an FPGA design of general purpose crypto-coprocessor, which is capa-
ble of selecting different algorithms through programming and performing 
crypto operations like key management, data encryption and decryption. The 
authors raise concern relating to processing speed for hardware implementa-
tion of algorithm. Although, hardware implementations usually run at higher 




the co-processor into account, the advantage of the co-processor‟s processing 
speed may be lower. So there is a trade-off between speed and reconfigurable 
character of the co-processor. 
In all the co-processor based crypto engine designs, the communication 
between the co-processor and the microcontroller is still the weakest link since 
the crypto engine is housed off-chip. A single chip VLSI solution where the mi-
crocontroller core and the crypto-engine are integrated is preferred to avoid 
concerns relating to the security of the co-processor. 
2.2.3 Hybrid  Architecture 
The “SCAN-Secure Processor” [32] presents a monolithic secure proces-
sor architecture based on encryption of the 32-bit bus path using SCAN me-
thodology and later on, XORing this encrypted bus path with a 32 bit XOR key 
to achieve further encryption strength. The processor also supports image 
compression, image encryption and information hiding in images based on 
SCAN algorithms. The crypto engine for encryption and decryption of instruc-
tions and data is housed on-chip, between the cache and the CPU, while the 
hardware to implement image compression, image encryption and information 
hiding in images is implemented on an off-chip FPGA co-processor. A single 
chip VLSI implementation of all the modules is desired to increase perfor-
mance and security. 
2.3 Comparative Survey 




ious methods reviewed in the previous section. Table.1 lists the surveyed archi-
tectures with their abbreviations. To evaluate the surveyed designs we use the 
following features: Simplicity (F1), Complexity (F2), Originality (F3), Real ap-
plication (F4), Real time processing (F5), Product (F6), Computational require-
ments (F7), User friendliness (F8), Performance and tests on real cases (F9), Re-
liability (F10), Robustness (F11), Security levels (F12), Requires training to user 
(F13), Further improvements (F14), Implementation (F15) and Prototype (F16). 
For each feature a weight is assigned which reflects its importance from the 
user‟s and the engineer‟s view as seen in Table 2 (weights table). We grade each 
methodology, if possible with a value (xi) between 1 and 10 as seen in Table 3 
(scores table). The scores are assigned with 10 standing for highest score and 1 
standing for the lowest score applicable for that feature. If we don‟t grade one 
characteristic, we make it 0, that means that the characteristic is not available or 
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total score of each methodology is calculated, where „i‟ refers to a specific cha-
racteristic, „N‟ is the total number of characteristics for each system, „b‟ is bias 
(for now, b=0) and „wi‟ is the average weight from the weights table.  
Table 2-1. List of Surveyed Secure Processor Architectures 
ARCHITECTURE ABBREVIATION 
AEGIS: Architecture for Tamper-Evident and Tamper-
Resistant Processing 
M1 
Single-chip FPGA implementation of a cryptographic 
co-processor 
M2 
A reconfigurable public-key cryptography coprocessor M3 
A design of hardware cryptographic co-processor M4 
Secure Processor: Deep Code Scrambling M5 




Fast secure processor for inhibiting software piracy and 
tampering 
M7 
Secure Blue: An Architecture for Scalable, Reliable 
High Volume SSL Internet Server 
M8 
DS5240 High-Speed Secure Microcontroller - Max-
im/Dallas Semiconductor 
M9 
Secure memory management unit for microprocessor M10 
Secure processor with external memory using block 
chaining and block reordering 
M11 
A Code Compression Method to Cope with Security 
Hardware Overheads 
M12 
Authentication Control Point and Its Implications For 
Secure Processor Design 
M13 
Efficient memory integrity verification and encryption 
for secure processors 
M14 
Architectural support for copy and tamper resistant 
software 
M15 
LaGrande Technology Architectural Overview M16 
BCM5890: Secure Applications Processor M17 
Table 2-2. Weights Table (Secure Processor Architectures) 
 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15 F16 
USER'S 
PERSPECTIVE 
2 1 1 10 10 10 7 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 9 9 
ENGINEER'S 
PERSPECTIVE 
9 10 7 10 10 9 9 8 10 10 10 10 7 10 9 9 
AVERAGE 5.5 5.5 4 10 10 9.5 8 9 10 10 10 10 8.5 9.5 9 9 
Table 2-3. Scores Table (Secure Processor Architectures) 
 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15 F16 Total 
Final 
Total 
M1 2 9 9 7 7 1 9 6 6 7 6 9 8 7 3 8 876 46.11 
M2 4 7 6 8 7 1 8 6 6 7 6 7 8 7 3 7 837 44.05 
M3 4 7 6 8 7 1 8 6 6 7 6 7 8 7 3 7 837 44.05 
M4 5 6 6 7 8 1 8 6 6 7 6 7 8 7 3 7 837 44.05 
M5 6 5 6 8 7 10 7 6 6 7 6 8 8 7 6 8 875 46.05 
M6 7 6 6 7 7 1 7 6 6 7 6 7 8 7 3 7 830 43.68 
M7 7 7 6 8 8 1 8 6 6 7 6 7 8 7 3 7 863.5 45.45 
M8 5 7 7 9 8 10 7 8 8 8 8 8 6 7 9 9 991.5 52.18 
M9 7 7 7 9 8 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 6 7 9 9 1011 53.18 
M10 7 7 7 9 8 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 6 7 9 9 1011 53.18 
M11 7 7 7 9 8 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 6 7 9 9 1011 53.18 
M12 6 8 6 7 7 1 9 6 6 7 6 7 8 7 3 7 851.5 44.82 
M13 7 7 6 6 7 1 7 6 6 7 6 7 8 7 3 7 825.5 43.45 
M14 6 6 6 6 7 1 8 6 6 7 6 7 8 7 3 7 822.5 43.29 
M15 6 7 8 7 7 1 8 6 6 7 6 7 8 7 3 7 846 44.53 
M16 7 7 8 9 8 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 6 7 9 9 1015 53.39 




















Fig. 2-4. Comparative Scores Chart (Secure Processor Architectures) 
The scores from the evaluation Table.2-3 are presented in Fig.2-4, as a 
column chart, for easy comprehension. Evaluating the final score for each me-
thodology in Table 3, we find that the commercially available secure processor 
architectures score better as compared to the academically available designs in 
terms of the tradeoff between performance and security. This is because the 
commercially available secure processors are used in various devices and have 
been implemented practically. It is also observed that monolithic architectures 
where the crypto-engine is placed on-chip, provides better security and per-
formance as compared to techniques which propose co-processor based crypto-
engine. This is because the communication bus between the co-processor and 
the CPU can be compromised and concerns relating to the security of the co-





In the previous section, recent trends in secure-crypto processor designs 
were presented. Considering all the above surveyed architectures, we can con-
clude that the trade-offs between security, efficiency, complexity and flexibility 
is an important aspect that needs to be considered based on application before 
the design and architecture of the secure-crypto processor is proposed. Of 
course, security carries a performance penalty; as security measures in the ar-
chitecture increase, the hardware complexity also increases and compromise on 
flexibility and speed of operation is necessitated. It is also important to mention 
that our comparative study does not intend to point one or more designs better 
than others, which requires to run same applications under same conditions on 
these secure processor designs, but to indicate the status of the current perfor-
mance of these designs and their potential improvements if desirable.  
Looking at the tables, one could argue that the criterion "Security Levels 
(F12)" in its own right could supersede all other ones because a processor 
which is "Original (F3)", “User friendly (F8)" and "Simple (F1)" can rank higher 
than one which supports more "Security levels (F12)", is "Robust (F11)" and is 
tested on "Real cases (F9)", if all other remaining scores are the same. This 
means that providing security is not just an act of securing data, but is a broad-
er panorama that encompasses human perception and information assimila-
tion, human interaction with machines and the social issues involved with pro-
viding security that may be specific to the application that needs to be secured. 




3 CHAPTER THREE 
In this chapter, we present a detailed architecture and instruction set of 
the SCAN secure processor and its cryptographic, steganographic and data 
compression capabilities. The SCAN secure processor is a modified SparcV8 
processor architecture with new instruction set to handle image compression, 
encryption and information hiding based on SCAN methodology. The modules 
for image compression, encryption and information hiding are synthesized in 
reconfigurable logic. We propose to implement the above mentioned modules 
in an off-chip FPGA co-processor. The IEEE compliant VHDL code is generated 
using Matlab version 7 Simulink HDL Coder. The synthesis of the reconfigura-
ble architecture is done using the Matlab generated VHDL code and XILINX 
ISE ver. 9.1i. The encryption and decryption of the 32-bit instruction and data is 
achieved using the SCAN based methodology, implemented by an on chip 
crypto-engine.  
The complete architecture demands a seamless coupling of hardware 
and software to achieve maximum efficiency and optimum performance. The 
cycle accurate simulation of the SCAN encrypted instruction execution was 
achieved by modifying the SparcV8 simulator provided by the ArchC team 
[39]. ArchC is a simple language, capable of describing processor architecture 
as well as a memory hierarchy that follows SystemC syntax style. SystemC is 




abstraction level for hardware design and verification. SystemC is entirely 
based on C/C++ and the complete source code for the simulation kernel is 
freeware [40].  
Integration of capabilities like data compression, encryption and infor-
mation hiding in secure processor architecture addresses the need for provid-
ing enhanced security, minimum memory requirement for data archival and 
secure transmission of compressed data. In this entire chapter, we consider im-
ages of size 128x128 with 8 bit depth, unless otherwise mentioned. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 gives a brief description 
of SCAN methodology and its applications. Section 3.2 gives a brief description 
of SparcV8 processor architecture and its features. Section 3.3 describes the 
SCAN processor architecture. Section 3.4 describes the FPGA co-processor in-
terface along with new instruction set to handle the proposed hardware en-
hancements. Section 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 describes the FPGA co-processor for the 
image compression, encryption and information hiding modules respectively. 
Section 3.8 presents the results of XILINX ISE synthesis of the above mentioned 
modules. Section 3.9 describes the secure computing feature of the SCAN se-
cure processor along with the cycle accurate simulation results. Section 3.10 
presents the performance analysis of the SCAN-Secure Processor based on cer-
tain Simulated Benchmark Programs. Section 3.11 discusses the compiler re-
quirements to support the proposed architecture. Section 3.12 provides the 





3.1 SCAN Methodology 
SCAN is a formal language-based, two-dimensional spatial accessing 
methodology that can represent and generate a large number of scanning paths 
easily.  The SCAN language is defined by a grammar and has a set of basic scan 
patterns, a set of transformations, and a set of rules to compose simple scan 
patterns to obtain complex scan patterns. The rules for building complex scan 
patterns from simple scan patterns are specified by the production rules of the 
grammar of the SCAN language. The SCAN language has applications in in-
formation compression, information encryption, and information hiding. The 
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Fig. 3-1. Basic SCAN Patterns 
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In this chapter, FPGA coprocessor architecture capable of implementing 
the SCAN based algorithms for image compression, encryption and informa-
tion hiding is presented along with new instructions to implement the same. 
Also SCAN methodology based pipelined encryption and decryption of in-
structions and data is presented. 
3.2 SparcV8 Processor 
SPARC [37] is a CPU instruction set architecture, derived from a re-
duced instruction set computer lineage. SPARC features a linear, 32 bit address 
space with a few and simple instructions, 32 bits wide. There are only three ba-
sic instruction formats, and they feature uniform placement of op-code and 
register address fields. Only load and store instructions access memory and 
I/O. The addressing modes include “register + register” or “register + imme-
diate” and triadic register operations, which operate on two register operands 
(or one register and a constant), and place the result in a third register. There 
also exists a large “windowed” register file, which allows a program to see 8 
global integer registers plus a 24-register window at any instant. These win-
dowed registers act as a cache for procedure arguments, local values, and re-
turn addresses. The SPARC architecture also provides for a separate floating 
point register file, configurable by software into 32 single precision (32 bit), 16 
double precision (64 bit), 8 quad precision registers (128 bit) or a mixture the-
reof. Trap handling is done through a vectored table that causes allocation of a 
fresh register window in the register file. In case of the delayed control transfer 




control transfer instruction. It either executes the instruction or not depending 
on the control transfer instruction‟s “annul” bit. While executing a multipro-
cessor synchronization instruction, a single instruction performs an atomic 
read and then set memory operation; another performs an atomic exchange 
register with memory operation. The SPARC architecture defines a 
straightforward coprocessor instruction set, in addition to the floating point 
instruction set.  The proposed SCAN-SP is a modified SparcV8 architecture to 
accommodate secure computing features. 
3.3 SCAN-SP Architecture – Crypto Capabilities 
In this section, the SCAN-SP architecture with respect to its crypto ca-
pabilities is described. The FPGA based co-processor architecture to implement 
image compression, encryption and information hiding is presented along with 
the new instruction set to handle the off-chip co-processor. The reconfigurable 
architecture of the above mentioned modules is synthesized on the Xilinx 
XCV600 FPGA. Also, SCAN based methodology for encryption and decryption 
of instructions is presented along with performance analysis of the proposed 
architecture. Further, compiler issues to support the proposed architecture are 
also discussed. 
3.3.1 FPGA Co-Processor Interface 
In this section, we describe the FPGA co-processor interface along with 
new instructions to implement image compression, encryption and information 




processor to implement the above mentioned operations.  The coprocessor in-
struction set for SparcV8 includes support for a single, implementation-
dependent coprocessor. The coprocessor has its own set of registers, the actual 
configuration of which is implementation-defined. Coprocessor load/store in-
structions are used to move data between the coprocessor registers and memo-
ry. To enable a coprocessor, the enable coprocessor (EC) bit (Bit 13) in the Pro-
gram Status Register (PSR) is 1. If a coprocessor is not present, the enable co-
processor (EC) bit in the PSR is 0 and a coprocessor instruction generates a cp 
disabled trap. All of the coprocessor data and control/status registers are op-
tional and implementation-dependent. The coprocessor working registers are 
accessed via load/store coprocessor and CPop1/CPop2 format instructions. 
The Sparc architecture also provides instruction support for reading and writ-
ing a Coprocessor State Register (CSR) and a coprocessor deferred-trap queue 
(CQ). 
A tightly coupled coprocessor architecture with dedicated data-path 
and a local memory system is required. The coprocessor interacts with the 
main processor through asynchronous FIFOs which enable the coprocessor to 
be implemented with a clock frequency different from the processor system. 
The coprocessor is integrated into the processor subsystem using a dedicated 
coprocessor interface as shown in Fig.3-3. A dedicated coprocessor interface 
provides higher data rate between processor cache and the coprocessor and 






Fig. 3-3. FPGA Co-Processor Interface for Crypto Operations 
The CPop1 and CPop2 instruction format is as shown in Fig.3-4, as giv-
en in the SparcV8 manual. 
Opcode op3 Operation 
CPop1 110110 Coprocessor Operate 





Fig. 3-4. CPop1 & CPop2 Instruction Format 





Copop1 opc, cregrs1, cregrs2,  cregrd 
Copop2 opc, cregrs1,  cregrs2,  cregrd 
 
Fig. 3-5. Suggested Assembly Syntax 
The new coprocessor instructions to enable SCAN based image com-
pression, encryption and information hiding are explained next. Data transfer 
across the external memory and the coprocessor memory is implemented by 
transferring four bytes of data simultaneously on the 32 bit data bus. The four 
image bytes on the data bus are decrypted using the SCAN methodology and 
the XOR key before being stored in the coprocessor memory. Similarly the four 
image bytes are encrypted using the SCAN methodology and the XOR key be-
fore being stored in the external memory. The new instructions are explained 
next: 
LOADIMG – The load image (LOADIMG) instruction moves the image 
file from external memory into the coprocessor memory.   
STOREIMG – The store image (STOREIMG) instruction removes the 
image file from the coprocessor memory and stores it in the external memory. 
LOADMSG – The load message (LOADMSG) instruction moves the 
message file from external memory into the coprocessor memory. 
STOREMSG – The store message (STOREMSG) instruction removes the 
message file from the coprocessor memory and stores it in the external memo-
ry. 




encryption key from the external memory into the coprocessor memory. 
LOADKEY2 – The load key2 (LOADKEY2) instruction moves the 
second encryption key from the external memory into the coprocessor memo-
ry. 
LOADSEED – The load seed (LOADSEED) instruction loads the seed 
needed by the random number generator of the encryption and decryption 
modules. This instruction is followed immediately by the seed value as an im-
mediate operand.  
CMPRS_IMG – The compress image (CMPRS_IMG) instruction com-
presses the image and the result is available in the coprocessor memory. The 
image file should be present in the coprocessor memory before this instruction 
can be issued. 
DCMPRS_IMG – The decompress image (DCMPRS_IMG) instruction 
decompresses the compressed image and the result is available in the coproces-
sor memory. The compressed image file should be present in the coprocessor 
memory before this instruction can be issued. 
ENCRYPT – The encrypt image (ENCRYPT) instruction encrypts the 
image and the result is available in the coprocessor memory. The image file 
should be present in the coprocessor memory before this instruction can be is-
sued. 
DECRYPT – The decrypt image (DECRYPT) instruction decrypts the 
image and the result is available in the coprocessor memory. The encrypted 




can be issued. 
INFOHIDE – The information hide (INFOHIDE) instruction embeds the 
message into the image file. The result of this operation is available in the co-
processor memory. Both the message file and the image file should be present 
in the coprocessor memory before this instruction can be issued.  
INFOEXTRACT – The information extract (INFOEXTRACT) instruction 
extracts the embedded message from the cover image. The image file needs to 
be present in the coprocessor memory before this instruction can be issued. The 
extracted message is available in the coprocessor memory.  
CMPRS_ENCR – The compress and encrypt image (CMPRS_ENCR) in-
struction compresses the image and encrypts the compressed image. The result 
of this operation is available in the coprocessor memory. The image file should 
be present in the coprocessor memory before this instruction can be issued.  
DECR_DCMPRS – The decrypt and decompress image 
(DECR_DCMPRS) instruction decrypts the input image and further decom-
presses the result of decryption. The result of this operation is available in the 
coprocessor memory. The image file should be present in the coprocessor 
memory before this instruction can be issued.  
INFOHIDE_CMPRS – The information hide and compress (INFO-
HIDE_CMPRS) instruction embeds the message into the cover image and com-
presses the resultant image. Both the message file and the image file should be 
present in the coprocessor memory before this instruction can be issued.  




(DCMPRS_INFOEXTRACT) instruction decompresses the compressed image 
and extracts the message from the decompressed image. The result of this op-
eration is available in the coprocessor memory. The compressed image file 
should be present in the coprocessor memory before this instruction can be is-
sued.  
INFOHIDE_ENCR – The  information hide and encrypt (INFOHIDE_ 
ENCR) instruction embeds the message into the cover image and further en-
crypts the cover image. The result of this operation is available in the coproces-
sor memory. Both the message file and the image file should be present in the 
coprocessor memory before this instruction can be issued.  
DECR_INFOEXTRACT – The decrypt and information extract 
(DECR_INFOEXTRACT) instruction decrypts the encrypted image and extracts 
the embedded message from the decrypted image. The result of this operation 
is available in the coprocessor memory. The encrypted image file should be 
present in the coprocessor memory before this instruction can be issued. 
INFOHIDE_CMPRS_ENCR – The information hide, compress and en-
crypt instruction (INFOHIDE_CMPRS_ENCR) embeds the message file into 
the cover image file and further compresses and encrypts this resultant image. 
The result of this operation is available in the coprocessor memory. Both the 
image file and the message file should be present in the coprocessor memory 
before this instruction can be issued. 
DECR_DCMPRS_INFOEXTRACT – The decrypt, decompress and in-




encrypted image and further decompresses it and extracts the embedded mes-
sage. The result of this operation is available in the coprocessor memory. The 
compressed, encrypted image file should be present in the coprocessor memo-
ry before this instruction can be issued. 
In the following sections the modules for image compression, encryp-
tion and information hiding are described. The size of image considered is 
128x128 bytes throughout this chapter, unless otherwise mentioned.            
3.3.2 Lossless Image Compression 
The lossless image compression algorithm consists of four main steps.  
These steps are (1) scanning and prediction (2) scan path encoding (3) context 
modeling (4) arithmetic coding.  The image is first partitioned into blocks of 
size 2k2k, k2.  Each block is then scanned with various scan paths and pixel 
values are predicted using different predictors along the scan paths i.e., for 
each scan path, the sum of absolute values of prediction errors (the difference 
in pixel intensity values) and the number of bits needed to encode the scan 
path are computed.  For each block, the scan path which minimizes the predic-
tion errors and encoding bits is chosen as the best scan path of the block.  Re-
cursive hardware to find the best scan path is presented in the work by Kach-
ris, Maniccam, Dollas and Bourbakis [33]. 
In this chapter a reconfigurable architecture for the BlockError() func-
tion, for scanning and prediction, and the Context() function, for context model-





(E, L) = BlockError(I, kt) 
Inputs:    Image block I, scan path kt 
Outputs: Sum E of absolute values of prediction errors along kt, Sequence L of 
prediction errors along kt 
{ 
    Let E = 0, L =  
    Scan block I using scan path kt and at each pixel p do 
    { 
        Determine predictor at p and determine predictor neighbors       {q, r}  
        Let s be the pixel which was scanned before p 
        If q and r are already scanned 
            e = p – (q + r)/2 
        Else 
            e = p – s 
        E = E + Abs(e), L = Append(L , e) 
    }  
    Return (E, L) 
} 
 
The image of size 128x128 is partitioned into 4 blocks of size 64x64 
which can be processed in parallel by the BlockError() function implemented on 
the FPGA. Matlab code to find the prediction errors, embedded in the Simulink 
subsystem, as seen in Fig.3-6, is used to generate the IEEE compliant VHDL 
code that can be used to synthesize the FPGA for finding the prediction errors. 
All the prediction errors are buffered and the absolute sum of the pre-
diction errors is written into a register on the FPGA. This register is conti-
nuously updated with the absolute sum of the prediction errors and the final 
value is obtained in this register at the 4096th clock cycle since one clock cycle 
is required to find the prediction error at one pixel „p‟. Even though all these 




IO utilization, which prevents us from duplicating further blocks on the same 
FPGA. The best scan path is the path with the least absolute sum of prediction 
errors. This operation is continuously repeated until all the basic SCAN pat-
terns {C, D, O, S} including {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} are exhausted. Multiple FPGAs 
with four blocks each can be used to achieve maximum parallelization and ex-
haust all the basic SCAN patterns in 4096 clock cycles. By making the circuit 




















Once the best scan path and the sequence of prediction errors along the 
scan path are determined for each block, the best scan path is encoded and the 
sequence of contexts of prediction errors along the best scan path are computed 
using Context() function which is described next. 
L = Context(I, P) 
Inputs:  Image block I, Scan path P 
Output: Sequence L of contexts along P 
{ 
    Let L =  
    Scan I using scan path P and at each pixel p do 
    { 
        Determine predictor at p and determine context neighbors {q,r,s} 
        Let u, v be the first and second pixels which were scanned before p 
        If q, r, s are already scanned 
            a = (|q – r| + |r – s|)/2 
        Else 
            a = |u – v| 
        Let b = 0 if 0  a  2, b = 1 if 3  a  8, b = 2 if 9  a  15, b = 3 if a  16  
        L = Append(L, b) 
    } 
    Return L 
} 
 
The values of „q‟, „r‟ and „s‟ are previously buffered and at every clock 
cycle the context at pixel „p‟ is calculated. FLAG is set to 1 implies that the „q‟, 
„r‟ and „s‟ are already scanned else not. The context „b‟ at „p‟ is appended to a 
buffer. The method to find predictor values, predictor neighbors and context 
neighbors (q, r, and s) is explained in [35]. Four blocks can be processed in pa-
rallel by parallelizing the Context() function. Matlab code to find the context, 























Fig. 3-7. Simulink Model to find the Context 
Once the sequence of prediction errors and the corresponding sequence 
of contexts are determined for each block, the prediction error sequence and 




pending the error sequences of blocks together and context sequences of blocks 
together in the C0 order in which the blocks were processed.  The prediction 
errors of the whole image are then encoded with context based adaptive arith-
metic coding using ArithmeticCode() function which is described in [35]. Arith-
metic coding is a method for lossless data compression. It is a form of variable-
length entropy encoding that converts a string into another representation that 
represents frequently used characters using fewer bits and infrequently used 
characters using more bits, with the goal of using fewer bits in total. 
After arithmetic coding is completed, the encoder sends a header in-
formation containing number of bits to the decoder and then sends the bits se-
quentially to the memory. The header of the compressed image provides in-
formation on the SCAN path chosen, the size of the image and the values of the 
first two pixels. This information is used to decompress the compressed image. 
3.3.3 Image Encryption and Decryption 
SCAN methodology offers a symmetric private key encryption. Image 
encryption using the SCAN methodology and its reconfigurable architecture is 
discussed in this section. The image encryption method is based on permuta-
tion of the pixels of the image and replacement of the pixel values.  The permu-
tation is done by scan patterns generated by the SCAN methodology.  The pix-
el values are replaced using a simple substitution rule which adds confusion 
and diffusion properties.  The permutation and substitution operations are ap-
plied in intertwined manner and iteratively producing an iterated product ci-




J = Encrypt(I, N, k1, k2, p, m) 
Inputs:  Image I, Image size NN (N = 2n, n2) 
               Encryption keys k1 and k2, Random seed integer p 
               Number of encryption iterations m 
Output:  Encrypted image J  
{ 
      Let A, D, G be two dimensional arrays of size NN and let B, C, E, F, R be 
one dimensional arrays of length NN 
     Generate NN random integers between 0 and 255 using random seed p and 
assign to R 
     Copy I into A 
     Repeat m times 
     { 
          Read pixels of A using key k1 and write into B 
          C[1]=B[1], C[j]=(B[j]+((C[j-1]+1)R[j])mod256)mod256 for 2jNN 
          Read pixels of C and write into D using spiral key s0 
          Read pixels of D using diagonal key d0 and write into E 
          F[1]=E[1], F[j]=(E[j]+((F[j-1]+1)R[j])mod256)mod256 for 2jNN 
          Read pixels of F and write into G using key k2 
     } 
     Copy G into J and return J 
} 
The encryption key actually consists of four components, namely, the 
two user specified scan keys k1 and k2, the random seed integer p, and the 
number of encryption iterations m.  These four encryption key components are 
known to both the sender and the receiver before the communication of en-
crypted image, via an un-trusted media.  The encryption algorithm uses four 
scan keys to increase the complexity of pixel rearrangement.  The keys k1 and 
k2 are specified by the user as part encryption key.  The other two keys spiral 
s0 and diagonal d0 are fixed as part of encryption algorithm.  These two keys 




hence increase the complexity of pixel rearrangement caused by the user speci-
fied keys k1 and k2. 
A good compromise between block size and SCAN keys is needed in 
order to achieve a combination of high encryption and high performance. In 
the architecture presented here, images of size 128x128 are partitioned into 
blocks of 64x64 for the purpose of encryption. The encryption process is itera-
tive to improve the strength of encryption. Five iterations of the encryption 
process using different seeds for the random number generator provide a high 
encryption quality. The reconfigurable architecture of the substitution block of 







Fig. 3-8. Simulink Model for Encryption (Pixel Value Substitution) 
The bitwise „and‟ with 255 is equivalent modulus operation with 256 
and is easier to implement in hardware. Though 16 bit multiplier is used in the 
implementation, only 8 bits of the LSB contain the needed value after the bit 
wise „and‟ operation. Four such blocks of encryption to enable parallel encryp-
tion of the 4 image blocks are used. The reconfigurable architecture of the subs-









Fig. 3-9. Simulink Model for Decryption (Pixel Value Substitution) 
Similarly four such blocks for decryption are used to enable parallel de-
cryption. A clear description of the address generation units that interface with 
the encryption and decryption modules is presented by Dollas, Kachris and 
Bourbakis [38]. 
3.3.4 Information Hiding 
The main idea of the image information hiding method is to identify the 
complex regions of the cover image and embed the secret data into those re-
gions.  The bits from the secret data are embedded into variable number of 
least significant bits of the pixels in complex regions depending on their com-
plexity.  The bits from the secret data are embedded into complex regions in 
random order determined by the secret SCAN key chosen by the user [35].  The 
embedding algorithm consists of four main steps.  These steps are (1) complexi-
ty identification of cover image (2) SCAN rearrangement of cover image and 
complexity matrix (3) bit embedding of secret data into rearranged cover image 
(4) reverse SCAN rearrangement of rearranged embedded image. The algo-
rithm to identify the complexity of the cover image chosen to embed the mes-




Complexity(I, C, k1, k2, k3, k4) 
Inputs:  Cover image I 
               Threshold values 0k1k2k3k4<255 
Output: Complexity matrix C 
{ 
     Let C[i][j] = 0 for 1iheight(I), 1jwidth(I) 
 
     For (i = 2 to height(I)-1,  i = i+2,  j = 2 to width(I)-1,  j = j+2) 
     { 
     
 d= 
 
          Let C[i][j] = 0,1,2,3,4 if 0d<k1, k1d<k2, k2d<k3, k3d<k4, k4d255, 
respectively        
     } 
} 
 
Matlab code to identify the complexity of the cover image, embedded in 
the Simulink subsystem, along with the Simulink subsytem, is used to generate 
the IEEE compliant VHDL code that can be used to synthesize the FPGA for 
identification of complexity of cover image. 
The embedding capacity i.e. ((embedded data size)/(cover image 
size))100% is at most 12.5% because at most 4 least significant bits of at most 1 
in 4 pixels of the cover image are used to embed data. In the bit embedding 
step, the secret data is embedded into the rearranged cover image.  The secret 
data is a bit stream which can come from binary/grayscale/color/compressed 
image, text, sound, video, copyright information, and etc.  The length of the bit 
stream is less than or equal to the total available embedding space (in bits) 















cover image.  Bit embedding is done by EmbedBit() function which is described 
next. 
EmbedBit(I, C, M) 
Inputs:  Rearranged cover image I 
               Rearranged complexity matrix C 
               Secret data bit stream M 
Output: Bits of M are embedded into I 
{ 
     Let p = length(M) 
     For (i = 1 to height(I),  j = 1 to width(I)) 
     { 
           If p equals 0 
                Stop embedding 
           Else 
                 k = minimum{C[i][j], p} 
                 Replace k least significant bits of I[i][j] with next k bits from M 
                 p = p - k  
     } 
} 
 
In the reconfigurable architecture the complexity values are initially 
calculated and stored in a FIFO buffer. Based on the buffered and rearranged 
complexity values, the bits in the image pixel are replaced with the message 
bits as described in the algorithm. Bit embedding is implemented using „bi-
tand‟ operation to clear the LS bits of the image byte and „bitor‟ operation to 
embed the message data in the image byte, based on the calculated „k‟ values. 
Every cycle, one image pixel is embedded with the message based on the calcu-
lated „k‟ values. Matlab code to embed the message in the cover image based 




Fig.3-10. This embedded Matlab function along with the Simulink subsystem is 
used to generate the IEEE compliant VHDL code that can be used to synthesize 









Fig. 3-10. Simulink Model to Embed Message 
In the bit extraction step, the bits of the secret data are extracted from 
the rearranged embedded image using ExtractBit() function, described next. 
ExtractBit(I, C, n, M) 
Inputs:  Rearranged embedded image I 
               Rearranged complexity matrix C 
               Length n of secret data in bits 
Output: Secret data M 
{ 
     For (i = 1 to height(I),  j = 1 to width(I)) 
     { 
           If n equals 0 
                Stop extracting 
           Else 
                 k = minimum{C[i][j], n} 
                 Extract k least significant bits of I[i][j] and append to M 
















Fig. 3-11. Simulink Model to Extract Message 
A „bitand‟ operation is used on the image bytes to extract the message 
bits from the cover image. The complexity identification step is the same as 
used before in the EmbedBit() function. The complexity matrices are the same 
because the 8-neighbors of each embedding candidate pixel are left unchanged.  
Note that the length (in bits) of the secret data is needed by ExtractBit() func-
tion, and this length is sent to the receiver in the header of the embedded im-
age. Matlab code to extract the message in the cover image based on the identi-
fied complexity is embedded in the Simulink subsystem as seen in Fig.3-11. 
This embedded Matlab function along with the Simulink subsystem is used to 
generate the IEEE compliant VHDL code that can be used to synthesize the 
FPGA that implements message extraction. 
If the presence of secret data is detected, the data cannot be read or un-
derstood without knowing the embedding SCAN key, because the data is em-




robust against passive attacks which are aimed at only detecting and reading 
the secret data.  But the method is not robust against active attacks which are 
aimed at destroying the secret data without reading it.  Since an attacker knows 
possible pixel locations where secret data can be embedded, the attacker can 
change the four least significant bits of all those pixels, thereby destroying the 
secret data. 
3.3.5 Results of FPGA Synthesis 
The results of XILINX ISE synthesis of FPGA modules to support the 
image compression, encryption and information hiding are tabulated in this 
section. Table.3-1 presents the synthesis results of compression module. Ta-
ble.3-2 presents the synthesis results of the encryption and decryption mod-
ules. Table.3-3 presents the synthesis results of the modules to embed and ex-
tract message in the cover image. XCV600 from the Virtex family was selected 
for the purpose of FPGA synthesis. 
Table 3-1. FPGA Synthesis: Compression Module 
Module 




Block Error Module  
(four blocks) 
164 2.3 
Context Module  
(four blocks) 
148 2.14 
Table 3-2. FPGA Synthesis: Encrypt/Decrypt Module 
Module 




Encrypt Module (one block) 33 0.47 






Table 3-3. FPGA Synthesis: Information Hide/Extract Module 
Module 




Embed Module 40 0.57 
Extract Module 26 0.37 
Complexity Module 80 1.15 
 
Table.3-4 provides the number of clock cycles required by the compres-
sion modules, i.e. Block Error module and the Context module. Each block re-
quires 4096 clock cycles to find the prediction error for one scan path. The basic 
scan paths {C, D, O, S} including {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7} are exhausted to find the 
minimum prediction error, processing 4 blocks in parallel. For the Context 
module, 4 bytes are transferred in parallel on the 32 bit data path to achieve 
parallelism in processing. 
Table 3-4. Clock Cycles for Compression Module 
Module Number of clock cycles 
Block Error Module 131072 
Context Module 4096 
 
The results of image compression using the SCAN-SP simulator are 
presented in Table.3-5 for the four test images.  



































Table.3-6. provides the number of clock cycles required for the Encryp-
tion module and Decryption module. The size of the images considered is 
128x128 bytes of 8 bit depth. These images are partitioned into blocks of size 
64x64 which are encrypted in parallel using the same encryption key.  Further 
iterations will require a multiple of the number of clock cycles required for one 
round of encryption. Four image bytes are encrypted in parallel in one clock 
cycle. 
Table 3-6. Clock Cycles for Encryption/Decryption Module 
Module Number of clock cycles 
Encrypt Module 4096 
Decrypt Module 4096 
 
The results of image encryption using the SCAN-SP simulator are pre-
sented in Table.3-7 for the same test images, with different keys. The output of 
the encryption is complete noise with a flat histogram which is in no way re-
lated to the input images. 
Table 3-7. Encrypted Images 
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The number of clock cycles required for information hiding depends on 
the size of the message and the complexity matrix of the cover image. The max-
imum coprocessor memory to accommodate all the results of the intermediate 
operations is 1024KB, which include the intermediate results of compression, 
encryption and information hiding. A tightly coupled hardware and software 
architecture is essential for the operation of the FPGA based coprocessor pre-
sented in this chapter. Recursive and time consuming operations are imple-
mented in reconfigurable logic while software and control signals play an im-
portant role in synchronizing the FPGA coprocessor with the processor system. 
One time operations, such as Arithmetic coding during image compression, are 
implemented in software as they do not present a huge computational over-
head. Fig.3-12 depicts the way in which information hiding is implemented us-
ing the user specified SCAN keys. The message is embedded in the cover im-
age. The cover image with the embedded message does not visually differ from 














Fig. 3-12. Information Hiding 
3.3.6 Instruction and Data Encryption and Decryption 
In this section a methodology to encrypt and decrypt instructions and 
data using SCAN methodology is presented. The external memory is assumed 
to be insecure. All instructions and data in the external memory are encrypted 
using the user specified SCAN key and the XOR key. Plain XOR method on 
correlated data such as instruction stream is ineffective; therefore we use the 
XOR method in combination with SCAN methodology to strengthen the en-
cryption process.  The on chip cache contains the instructions and data in the 
encrypted form. The instruction and data is decrypted just before it is decoded 
and executed. The instructions and data are decrypted using the same keys. 
The architecture of the SCAN-SP is as shown in Fig.3-13. 
In the architecture shown in Fig.3-13, two new registers are introduced 
to store the two encryption keys. The SCAN key register holds SCAN encryp-




XORed with the instruction to enable encryption or decryption. A Secure Scrat-
chpad Memory is introduced to hold the intermediate results of any operation. 
The on chip secure scratchpad memory is not encrypted. Three on chip random 
number generators are introduced for encryption. These three random number 
generators have three 8 bit registers to hold the three seed values, which are 
accessible using special instructions. As seen in Fig.3-14, the SCAN encryption 
and decryption unit sits in between the cache and the CPU core. The instruc-
tions and data are decrypted just before they are decoded by the CPU and en-
crypted just before they are stored on the on-chip cache. Thus the encryption 
and decryption unit is implemented as a pipeline stage in the proposed SCAN-
SP architecture. 
The SparcV8 is a RISC architecture where all the instructions are 32 bits 
in size. SCAN patterns are used to rearrange the bits in the instructions as 
shown in Fig.3-15. As an example the SCAN key B5 (e0 z0) is shown. Similarly 
different keys can be used. 
Simply scrambling the instruction in this manner is not safe because, by 
using statistical analysis; it is possible to observe the code execution sequence 
to determine where the branch instructions are, and subsequently, everything 
else. Therefore, this 32 bit, bit-rearranged instruction is further split into 4 bytes 
(8 bits each). These 4 bytes are further encrypted thrice using the SCAN en-
cryption based on three random seeds as shown in Fig.3-16. The SCAN en-
crypted instruction is further XORed with a user given 32 bit XOR key to fur-





CU     –   Control Unit, ALU –   Arithmetic Logic Unit, GPR   –   General Purpose 
Registers, SPR   –   Special Purpose Registers, MMU –   Memory Management 
Unit, S1, S2, S3 – 3 Seeds for Random Number Generators 
Fig. 3-13. SCAN-SP Architecture 
 
CU     –   Control Unit, ALU –   Arithmetic Logic Unit, GPR   –   General Purpose 
Registers, SPR   –   Special Purpose Registers, MMU –   Memory Management 
Unit, S1, S2, S3 – 3 Seeds for Random Number Generators 






Fig. 3-15. SCAN Bit Rearrangement of Instructions and Data 
 
Fig. 3-16. Instruction and Data Encryption Block (Pixel Value Substitution) 
The SCAN encryption and decryption can be hardwired in the proces-
sor architecture or it can be implemented in a microcode ROM. By hardwiring, 
the SCAN encryption or decryption can be implemented in seven clock cycles 
using multiplexers for bit rearrangement and on-chip random number genera-




number generators will take exactly six clock cycles in the pipelined version of 
encryption. The bit rearrangement takes one clock cycle. Therefore the SCAN 
encryption takes extra seven clock cycles for each instruction. 
Further encryption using the XOR key requires one more additional 
clock cycle. Therefore a total of extra 8 cycle latency is created per instruction 
by implementing the secure SCAN execution mode. The decryption also re-
quires the same amount of extra clock cycles per instruction. This 8 cycle laten-
cy is not visible in the pipelined execution of instructions, but is apparent in 
case of successful branching in the program execution. This is because the pipe-
line is flushed and it has to be filled with new instruction originating from the 
branched location. Therefore every time the program execution branches, there 
has to be an account for the 8 cycle latency to calculate the total number of 
clock cycles required for execution of entire encrypted program. 
3.3.7 Performance Analysis 
Control-transfer instructions (CTIs) include PC-relative branches and 
calls, register-indirect jumps, and conditional traps. Most of the control-transfer 
instructions are delayed control-transfer instructions (DCTIs), where the in-
struction immediately following the DCTI is executed before the control trans-
fer to the target address is completed. The instruction following a delayed con-
trol-transfer instruction is called a delay instruction. The delay instruction is 
always fetched, even if the delayed control transfer is an unconditional branch. 
However, a bit in the delayed control transfer instruction can cause the delay 




(or in the branch always case, if the branch is taken). When a delay instruction 
is itself a control-transfer instruction, the pair of instructions is referred to as a 
delayed control-transfer instruction couple [37].  
The total number of Control Transfer Instructions is given by the sum of 
the total number of branches, jumps, calls, traps and returns. Of these CTIs, 
some of them will not be successful while some CTIs will result in branching 
and hence results in flushing of the pipeline. 
To analyze the performance of the proposed processor architecture, we 
execute Simulated Benchmark Programs (SBP) containing commonly used op-
erations, on the SCAN-SP simulator and observe the CTIs in the program ex-
ecution. The SBPs contain a random mixture of integer multiplication, integer 
division, quick sort and integer matrix multiplication operations. These opera-
tions are implemented as function calls and called randomly depending upon 
the result of a random number generator. The integers used in these operations 
are also generated using random number generators.  
Cycle accurate simulation was achieved by modifying the SparcV8 
model provided by the ArchC team. All these operations are implemented as C 
programs which are converted to executables of Executable Linkable Format 
(ELF) and executed on the modified SparcV8 architecture, i.e. SCAN-SP simu-







Table 3-8. Number of Individual Operations in each Simulated Benchmark Program 
Program # Multiplications # Divisions 
#Quick Sort 
(100 Elements) 
# 3x3 Matrix 
Multiplications 
SBP1 14 10 13 13 
SBP2 26 20 25 29 
SBP3 126 113 127 134 
SBP4 251 212 263 274 
SBP5 1248 1157 1259 1336 
SBP6 724 2174 1421 681 
SBP7 690 1415 2180 715 
SBP8 1454 4320 2838 1388 
SBP9 0 0 500 0 
SBP10 1483 517 0 0 
SBP11 235 765 0 0 
SBP12 0 0 1303 447 
SBP13 0 0 402 1098 
 
Tables 3-9 and 3-10 provide an analysis and a comparison of the CPI for 
the cycle accurate simulation of SCAN encrypted instructions, with normal in-
struction execution for the Simulated Benchmark Programs. We observe an in-
crease in CPI due to SCAN encryption and decryption of instructions and data.  
Fig.3-17 shows the comparison plot of CPI without SCAN encryption and de-
cryption and CPI with SCAN encryption and decryption of instructions for the 
considered Simulated Benchmark Programs. 
Table 3-9. Clock Cycles per SBP with and without SCAN Encryption 






# cycles  
with SCAN 
SBP1 4079898 442721 384354 5800245 8875076 
SBP2 6121976 663255 576111 8702970 13311858 
SBP3 29369242 3147982 2748291 41828168 63814489 
SBP4 64962024 6896328 6051803 92694387 141108820 
SBP5 179318029 18851716 16628124 256331712 389486923 
SBP6 408345674 43059954 37949442 583749390 887344950 
SBP7 621771804 64890785 57511107 890671742 1350760694 
SBP8 839867134 88076987 77843304 1201829790 1824576074 
SBP9 139662341 14570475 12919099 200107997 303460709 
SBP10 1732607 313649 204357 1961229 3596085 




SBP12 369307028 38571021 34172457 528962714 802342416 
SBP13 98579852 10396948 9141708 140759139 213892846 
 
Table 3-10. CPI with and without SCAN Encryption 
Program CPI without SCAN CPI with SCAN 
SBP1 1.421664 2.175318 
SBP2 1.421595 2.174438 
SBP3 1.424217 2.172834 
SBP4 1.426901 2.172174 
SBP5 1.429481 2.171319 
SBP6 1.429547 2.173024 
SBP7 1.432474 2.172438 
SBP8 1.430976 2.172458 
SBP9 1.432799 2.172817 
SBP10 1.131953 2.075534 
SBP11 1.130780 2.090651 
SBP12 1.432312 2.172562 












Fig. 3-17. CPI plot with and without SCAN Encryption from Table 3-3 
Table.3-11 provides the analysis of the relationship between the number 
of successful branches and the total number of instructions, resulting in the in-




to be noted that as the ratio of the number of successful branches to the total 
number of instructions executed increases, the CPI for program execution with 
SCAN encryption also increases. We also observe that the percentage increase 
in CPI due to SCAN encryption varies as we vary the probability of each opera-
tion being executed. Fig.3-17. is the graphical depiction of Table.3-11. 
Table 3-11. Percentage increase in CPI due to SCAN Encryption 
Program 
# CTIs executed / total # instruc-
tions 
% increase in CPI due to 
SCAN 
SBP1 0.094207 53.0121 % 
SBP2 0.094105 52.95763 % 
SBP3 0.093577 52.56341 % 
SBP4 0.093159 52.23018 % 
SBP5 0.09273 51.89562 % 
SBP6 0.0929346 52.007849 % 
SBP7 0.092495521 51.656395 % 
SBP8 0.09268526 51.816518 % 
SBP9 0.09250238 51.648502 % 
SBP10 0.117947694 83.358740 % 
SBP11 0.119983852 84.885747 % 
SBP12 0.092531294 51.682217 % 
SBP13 0.092734041 51.956610 % 
 
The median of the percentage increase in CPI due to SCAN encryption 
is around 52%, as seen in Table.3-11, we can conclude that executing regular 
applications on SCAN-SP results in a performance degradation in speed of ex-
ecution to the amount of 52%. Regular applications usually contain a combina-
tion of multiplications, divisions, additions, subtractions, register operations 
and memory accesses as seen in the SBPs considered above. Thus the proposed 
secure feature for the SCAN-SP comes at the cost of reduced speed of execu-
tion, which is a necessary trade off considering the increased security. Also it is 
















Fig. 3-18. Plot of % increase in CPI in SBP due to SCAN encryption to the ratio of num-
ber of CTIs executed / total number of instructions executed 
The drawback of encrypting instructions is that additional cycles are 
needed to decrypt these encrypted instructions before execution and thus an 
increase in CPI is experienced. Therefore it is to be noted that the secure com-
puting feature based on the SCAN encryption methodology comes at a cost of 
increased CPI. The formula for calculating the CPI for the execution of SCAN 
encrypted instructions is given by: 
Total Cycles without SCAN Encryption of Instructions + (Number of CTIs Executed)*8 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total number of Instructions 
 
The percentage increase in CPI for the execution of SCAN encrypted in-


























structions as compared to the execution of normal instructions is given by: 
(CPI with SCAN Encryption of Instructions – CPI with Normal Instructions)    X 100 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
CPI with Normal Instructions 
 
To enable accessing the SCAN key register, the XOR key register and to 
load the seeds for the random number generators, compiler support is needed 
along with new instructions which are explained in detail in the next section. 
3.3.8 Instructions to Access Special Registers 
In order to support the above architecture for 32 bit instruction and data 
encryption and decryption, seven new instructions are introduced. These in-
structions are not encrypted and are executed in a secure or trusted environ-
ment. The instructions are explained below. 
secure_load – The secure load (secure_load) instruction is executed in its 
non encrypted form in a trusted environment. This instruction implies the be-
ginning of the code block in which the SCAN key register, random number ge-
nerator seed registers and the XOR key register are accessed. When this in-
struction is executed, the previous contents of the SCAN key register, XOR key 
register, I-cache, D-cache, GPR, SPR, ALU, MMU and the Secure Scratchpad 
Memory are erased. The instructions following this command are not en-
crypted. 
load_scan_key – The load SCAN key (load_scan_key) instruction is ex-
ecuted in its non encrypted form in a trusted environment. This instruction is 




load_xor_key – The load XOR key (load_xor_key) instruction is executed 
in its non encrypted form in a trusted environment. This instruction is followed 
by the 32 bit XOR key which is loaded into the XOR key register. 
load_seed1 – The load Seed 1 (load_seed1) instruction is executed in its 
non encrypted form in a trusted environment. This instruction is followed by 
the 8 bit seed stored in an on-chip register required by the first on-chip random 
number generator. 
load_seed2 – The load Seed 2 (load_seed2) instruction is executed in its 
non encrypted form in a trusted environment. This instruction is followed by 
the 8 bit seed stored in an on-chip register required by the second on-chip ran-
dom number generator. 
load_seed3 – The load Seed 3 (load_seed3) instruction is executed in its 
non encrypted form in a trusted environment. This instruction is followed by 
the 8 bit seed stored in an on-chip register required by the third on-chip ran-
dom number generator. 
secure_lock – The secure lock (secure_lock) instruction is executed in its 
non encrypted form in a trusted environment. This instruction implies the end-
ing of the code block in which the SCAN key register and the XOR key register 
are programmed. All instructions following this command are encrypted. 
Access to SCAN key register and the XOR key register is not possible after this 
command. 
The loading of the SCAN key register, the XOR key register and the 




structions following the secure_lock command are encrypted using the SCAN 
methodology and XOR key before they are stored in the memory. This requires 
compiler and hardware to support the encryption of instructions and data be-











Fig. 3-19. Loading of Encryption and Decryption Keys 
3.4 Conclusion 
In the previous sections we presented the architecture of the SCAN se-
cure processor which is a modified SparcV8 architecture. We presented an in-
struction set to implement SCAN methodology based algorithms for image 
compression, encryption and information hiding, implemented on an off-chip 
FPGA co-processor. We presented the XILINX ISE synthesis results of the 
FPGA co- processor for the SCAN based compression, encryption and informa-




decryption of instructions and data along with the results of cycle accurate si-
mulation using the ArchC model for SparcV8 processor. 
We see that we require a seamless integration of hardware and software 
for optimum performance of the processor. The throughput of the system can 
further be increased by transferring 4 bytes at a time on the 32 bit wide bus 
along with using an edge triggered RAM for storing and retrieving data. We 
further note that we are not only limited to processing images using the SCAN 
based methodology, but we can also extend the methodology to process voice, 
text and other types of data by converting these types of data to 2-D and treat-
ing them as images. We can use zero padding on the data to achieve a 2nx2n 
size in case the data cannot be converted into a square matrix before processing 
it with the SCAN algorithms.  
However, the ultimate goal of this work is a detailed study of the tra-
deoffs that exist between speed of execution and processor security. There may 
be applications where speed of execution is of prime importance and there may 
also be applications where secure execution is of importance. Therefore, design 
methodology is always application specific and cannot be generalized. Further 
work in this direction will be the VLSI implementation of the coprocessor sub-








4 CHAPTER FOUR 
Biometrics is the study of methods for uniquely identifying or authenti-
cating humans based on intrinsic physical or behavioral traits. Identification 
means characteristics are selected from a database, to produce a list of possible 
or likely matches. Authentication means that when a person makes a claim that 
he or she is that specific person, just that specific person‟s characteristics are 
being checked to see if they match. The two important operations in a biome-
tric system are enrollment and test. During enrollment the biometric of the indi-
vidual is stored as a database, and during test the biometric information of the 
individual is detected and compared with the stored database. Various biome-
tric techniques are currently used, as shown in Fig.4-1. 
 
Fig. 4-1. Examples of Biometric Characteristics [87] 




describe biometric based methodologies on voice, iris, finger, palm, and face. 
We do not cover all the work done in the field of neural nets based biometrics, 
but we select a small set of NN-based methods from different forms of biome-
trics in order to capture the evolution of some of the most representative neural 
networks based methods. The objective is to provide to the readers the general 
idea behind neural nets based biometrics and their future [62-87].  
4.1 Voice Biometric 
Voice based authentication methodologies are the easiest to implement 
since they do not need a considerable amount of investment on hardware. Ex-
isting hardware can be used along with required software to implement a voice 
based identification system. This section contains the review of representative 
works that describe voice based identity verification systems. 
 
4.1.1 Speaker Verification by means of ANNs 
 
The two general approaches to speaker verification are text-dependent 
and text- independent. In a text dependent speaker verification system, a pre-
defined utterance by the user is used for training the system and testing/using 
it. In text-independent speaker verification, the text to be uttered is not pre-
scribed. Effectively, language does not matter. Reference and test signals are 
required to have identical wording. Intra-speaker variations are induced by 
emotional state of the speaker, health and aging whereas inter-speaker varia-





Prior to comparison of the reference and test speech, some kind of time 
alignment has to be performed between the two. This aligning of speech sig-
nals can be done by dynamic time warping (DTW). Once this alignment is 
done, corresponding frames of the test and reference signals can be directly 
compared to each other. For each pair consisting of a test and reference signal, 
a distance called local distance is computed. The global distance is then com-
puted by averaging the local distances over the length of the signal.  
In this work [62], Artificial Neural Network (ANN) based distance 
measure for the discrimination task is investigated. The test and reference 
speech signals are time aligned with the DTW algorithm that uses Euclidean 
cepstral distance as optimization criterion. For each frame of the aligned sig-
nals, features are extracted. These extracted features are then fed to the ANN, 
which yields a local distance for this pair of frames. These local distances are 
weighted and averaged over time to obtain the global distance, which is com-
pared to a pre determined threshold for classification. 
The ANN used in this study is a fully connected multi-layer perceptron 
with hyperbolic tangent activation function. For training, back propagation al-
gorithm is used along with the adaptive learning rate. Since the feature vector 
has 24 cepstral coefficients, we need 24 input nodes and 1 output node. Two 
hidden layers having 60 nodes in the first and 18 in the second produced op-
timal results. The calculated distances should be the same even if the reference 
and test feature vectors are interchanged. This invariance was built using the 




to normalize the data in order to have zero mean and diagonal co-variance ma-
trixes.  
Further transitional information using the first and second derivatives 
of the cepstrum coefficients was fed to the ANN along with the cepstrum coef-
ficients. For this purpose, the number of input nodes had to be tripled. Though 
this increased the fisher ratio for local distances, the global distances were dis-
torted leading to poor performance. To overcome this issue, the authors pro-
pose the use of parallel ANN. To the first ANN, only the cepstrum coefficients 
are presented, to the second ANN, the first derivatives of the cepstrum coeffi-
cients are presented and to the third, the second derivatives of the cepstrum 
coefficients are presented. Though the cepstrum coefficients or instantaneous 
features bear more information, the combination of their derivatives along with 
the cepstrum coefficients provide useful results.  
The test set considered here is 30 male speakers. Some 10 sessions per 
speaker were recorded within a time frame of several months using different 
telephones. The total duration of the collected speech is about 3 hours and the 
LPC cepstrum coefficients were extracted from 37.5 ms long speech frames 
with a frame shift of 15ms. The ANNs were trained with some 500,000 feature 
pairs from 20 speakers and tested with the remaining 10 speakers along with 
the 20 speakers.  
The authors claim that the above presented method showed good gene-
ralization and is virtually speaker independent. They further claim that new 




generalization is achieved, are not provided. Also the training set used is very 
small and if thousands of users are involved, generalization may not hold 
good.  
4.1.2 Speaker Specific Mapping for Text Independent Speaker 
Recognition 
In this work [63], the authors propose a mapping approach for the task 
of text-independent speaker recognition. The mapping property of a multi 
layer feed forward neural network (MLFFNN) is used to generate a model for 
each speaker. In the mapping approach, speaker specific information is cap-
tured by mapping a set of parameter vectors specific to linguistic information 
in the speech to a set of parameter vectors having linguistic and speaker infor-
mation.  
Linear prediction coding derived cepstral coefficients are used to derive 
suitable vectors for mapping approach. LP analysis is used to obtain clues 
about parameters that contain predominantly linguistic information or linguis-
tic and speaker information. After selecting the parameter vectors suitable for 
mapping, the next task is to derive the mapping function itself. The non-linear 
speaker specific mapping function can be captured using the MLFFNN, where 
the mean squared error is minimized using a gradient descent algorithm.  
For testing, the input parameter vector is presented to each MLFFNN 
and the difference between the desired output vector and the actual output 
vector of the MLFFNN is used as a distance for that frame. The total accumu-




proximity of test utterance.  
Euclidean distance between the output of the network and the desired 
output parameter vector was used for evaluating the performance of a speaker 
model relative to the models of other speakers. A background model (BG) is 
generated using the parameter vectors extracted from speech utterances of a 
large number of speakers registered with the system. The MLFFNN is trained 
with the pooled input and output parameter vectors from all the speakers. 
These weights from the BG model are then used to train each speaker model. 
This avoids the bias that any arbitrary initial weights may introduce while ge-
nerating a speaker model. The relative score for the test signal is obtained using 
the difference between the average distance for the BG model and the speaker 
model. Also, investigation on the frequency content shows that speaker specific 
information is available in the higher frequencies.  
The authors claim that the proposed mapping approach performs as ef-
ficiently as the GMM based approaches for all the 630 speakers in the database. 
But the number of free parameters is much less as compared to the Gaussian 
Mixture Models based approach.  
4.1.3 Neural Network for Improved Text Independent Speaker 
Identification 
In this work [64], the authors present a neural network array (NNA) 
that combines a binary partitioned approach having pattern index information 
with decision trees. The authors verify that the NNA can not only reduce the 




error. Speaker identification with radial basis function neural network 
(RBFNNA) is considered as an application of the NNA. The advantage of using 
NNA is that the architecture is expandable when a new entry is added; the 
main disadvantage of NNs needing to retain the entire network for the new 
catalog is partly overcome by the NNA. 
The authors present a fast searching algorithm for distinguishing N ca-
talogs by a cascading a decision and pruning criteria. The subnet is trained by 
two catalogs. In recognition stage, a subnet could accept one catalog and reject 
the other catalog. If a catalog is accepted we consider that it was similar to the 
correct catalog and the other must be incorrect. The search path for the algo-
rithm is from the top row to the bottom row. All the subnets that reject the un-
known catalog will be pruned.  
The database used consisted of speech utterances from 20 Chinese male 
post graduate students under normal lab conditions. The speech signal was 
sampled at 8 kHz with 16 bits ADC. Sixteen orders of linear predictive cepstral 
coefficients (LPCC) of each frame is adopted as the speaker‟s features.  The 
frames consist of 256 sample points with 128 overlapping sample points.  
The authors use the RBFNN because it has the same underlying struc-
ture of the Gaussian mixture models usually used in similar applications and 
also because the RBFNNs have efficient training algorithms where the number 
of nodes in the hidden layer can be automatically determined by orthogonal 
least squares. The number of nodes in the first layer is 16, in the output layer it 




The authors conclude that the larger the number of speakers, the higher 
the error rate for identification. To reduce the error rate, additional information 
of the catalog index can be used. Although NNA could deal with any classify-
ing problem, its application for speaker identification is limited. The authors 
conclude that, additionally, the NNAs are more suitable for difficult tasks like 
automatic classification of EEG or biomedical signals where the signals are cor-
rupted to a higher degree. 
4.1.4 Speaker Identification Using Neural Networks and Wavelets 
This work [65] presents an offline system that uses wavelets to generate 
multi-resolution time frequency features that characterize the speech waveform 
to successfully identify a speaker in the presence of competing speakers. The 
authors say that this system is successful for short utterances and has also been 
applied to inter-speaker speech recognition.  
The “cocktail party” effect describes the phenomenon in which humans 
can selectively focus attention to one sound source among competing sound 
sources. For the hearing impaired, the ability to achieve this effect is somewhat 
more difficult, as amplifying sound also translates into amplifying noise, which 
conventional hearing aids normally do. The primary objective of this research 
relates to noise in the ambient listening environment, such as with competing 
speakers. Therefore, before the signal processing can be applied to the sound 
signal arriving at the user‟s ears, a method must be first developed to differen-
tiate speech and noise, i.e. the noise is speech from a competing speaker. 




both time and frequency domains. Frequency analysis using fixed time win-
dow techniques such as the short time Fourier Transforms are fixed window 
resolution operators in which the time duration of the analysis is inversely 
proportional to the bandwidth of the filters, meaning that high frequency loca-
lization results in poor time resolution and vice versa.  
The multi-resolution analysis of speech models the cochlear mechanism 
of spectral decomposition during the initial stage of sound transduction, 
wherein a time varying signal is spatially distributed in patterns along the basi-
lar membrane. It has been shown that the nervous system processes spatially 
distributed patterns more efficiently than varying temporal signals.  
The original speech waveform sampled at 8 kHz is convolved with the 
high pass and low pass Quadrature Mirror Filters. The resulting convolution 
co-efficients are sub-sampled or decimated by a factor of two and they 
represent the co-efficients for that octave. Once the time–frequency features 
have been obtained for the various speech waveforms, the objective is to use 
these features in a pattern recognition scheme and in a manner that avoids the 
undesirability of the local convergence. The ALOPEX – Algorithms of Pattern 
Extraction – is a method developed to effectively find the global maxima and 
minima without local convergence, in a manner that does not require ineffi-
cient scanning.  
Three male and three females, including those with American, Chinese, 
and European accents, were used as subjects. Subjects were asked to speak into 




the microphone. The sampling rate and analog-to-digital conversion resolution 
were 8 kHz at 8 bits, respectively. Each speaker was asked to articulate a series 
of 10 words, three times each.  
After the input speech is pre-processed, it is made available to the 
wavelet transform. The signal detail co-efficients, which are time frequency fea-
tures, are generated for four octaves. Each octave has 64 bins spanning 896 
msec. Signals shorter than 896 msec are padded to that duration. The wavelet 
transform consists of convolutions of quadrature mirror filters. Because linear 
convolution is inefficient, a frequency based convolution was implemented. A 
problem with frequency based convolution is that FFT processes the input sig-
nal as if it is periodic, therefore resulting in side lobe artifacts. Also memory 
overhead is high to process the entire length of the waveform at one time. To 
circumvent these limitations, an overlapping windowing technique is used, in 
which the sampled waveform is processed in windows of 256 bytes with over-
laps of 32 bytes, in which each 8-bit sample is stored in a byte. 
Before the next window is processed, the resulting wavelet co-efficients 
for the current window are swapped to a disk. The current window that is read 
is processed entirely, but not all of the co-efficients are written to the disk, as 
the co-efficients closest to the boundary contain the artifacts associated with the 
FFT. The co-efficients from the next window   overwrite the artifact area of the 
previous window. The overlap values are determined as a ratio of windows 
overlapping each other by a factor of 1/8. As described above, the mean values 




time resolution that these subdivisions represent, the actual size of the window 
is truncated by the overlap of the preceding window. In this case, we have a 32 
bit overlap for the signal. These co-efficients are mapped to a 256 parameter 
vector and the ANN consists of 256 input nodes.  
The cocktail party effect was simulated by digital mixing with the input 
waveform from another speaker. Tests were also conducted with input wave-
forms corrupted with -20 dB white noise. Training data were not used as test-
ing data. Three methods of pattern recognition were implemented: ALOPEX 
template matching method, artificial neural network method using ALOPEX 
training algorithm, and artificial neural network using a back propagation 
learning algorithm. The neural network topology used in each neural network 
implementation consisted of 256 nodes in the input, 10 nodes in the hidden 
layer, and three nodes in the output layer. Each node of the output layer 
represents one of the three templates (speakers). For the NN topology, the 
ALOPEX method showed better convergence as compared to the back propa-
gation method.  
Due to computational overhead, the implementation of the cocktail par-
ty pre-processor into a digital hearing aid is presently unlikely. However, a 
feasible method of speaker identification in the presence of competing noise 
has been demonstrated, which is a complication that all speaker-and-speech 
recognition systems are susceptible to.  
4.2 Iris Scan Biometric 




tern recognition techniques based on high-resolution images of the iris of the 
individual's eyes. Iris scan based security systems offer robust and reliable au-
thentication as compared to other biometric methodologies. In this section, we 
review representative works describing iris scan systems for identity authenti-
cation. 
4.2.1 Fast Iris Detection for Personal Verification Using Modular Neural 
Nets 
The author presents the application of fast and co-operative modular 
neural nets (MNN) to automatically identify human irises in a given image 
[66]. Image acquisition of the irises cannot be expected to yield an image con-
taining only the irises. Therefore, prior to iris pattern matching, it is important 
to localize the portion of the acquired image corresponding to the iris. The 
work also aims to solve the problem of requiring large databases to build an 
automatic system in order to detect the location of the irises in the acquired im-
age. 
The MNN proposed in this work attempts to reduce the effects of over 
learning or under learning capabilities of the NN by using a divide and con-
quer approach, where large tasks are decomposed into smaller subtasks, each 
handled by a fast, simple, and efficient module. A fast searching algorithm for 
iris detection that reduces the computational complexity of the NNs is pre-
sented. 
In the initial proposed algorithm, the first step is histogram equalization 




gion of the gray scale image and generates an output region ranging from -1 to 
1, signifying the presence or absence of an iris respectively. The classifier is ap-
plied at every pixel position in the input image. To achieve rotation invariance, 
the NN is trained for images rotated from 0 degrees to 355 degrees by a step of 
5 degrees. To detect irises in a larger window size, the input image is repeated-
ly reduced in size. Thus, the classification has some invariance to rotation, 
translation, and scaling. 
To enhance the detection decision, the detection results of the neighbor-
ing windows are used to confirm the decision at a given location. This will re-
duce the false detection as neighboring windows may reveal non-iris characte-
ristics of the data. A threshold on the number of neighboring windows can be 
used for this task. Images in the databases were divided into three groups, 
which resulted in three NNs. Each group consisted of 400 patters (200 irises 
and 200 non irises). Each group is used to train one neural network. Each net-
work consists of 13 hidden neurons. The output layer consists of only one neu-
ron. Using the enhanced detection, the author claims up to 96% detection rate.  
The author also presents a fast algorithm using 2D cross correlation 
technique between the reference and the input images in a sliding window. 
This window is represented by the neural nets weights situated between the 
input unit and the hidden layer. The author proposes the use of Fast Fourier 
Transforms to speed up the calculation of the cross-correlation results.  
The author also proposes image normalization in the frequency space 




main normalization, which requires (N-n+1)2n2 operations, the proposed fre-
quency domain normalization requires 2n2 operations, where NxN is the image 
size and nxn is the sliding window size.  
The theoretical speedup factor K obtained is:  
K = [q(N-n+1) 2n2] / [(q+1)N2 log2N2 + qN2] 
The images were tested for the presence of iris at different scales by 
building a pyramid of the input image, which generates a set of images at dif-
ferent resolutions. The iris detector is applied at each resolution and this 
process takes much more time. To overcome this, in Fourier space, the new 
scales need not be computed. This is because if f(x,y) is the original image and 
g(x,y) is the sub sampled image by a factor of 2, then 
g(x,y) = FT(2x, 2y) 
The author further investigates the number of computation steps re-
quired by the neural nets on varying image sizes. It is found that as the size of 
the image increases, the number of computations do not increase linearly; .i.e., 
the number of computations for a 100x100 image is far greater as compared to a 
50x50 image. To overcome this disadvantage, the author proposes decompos-
ing the image into sub images and then testing these sub images separately.  
Further improvement can be achieved by using parallel processors on these 
sub images. Thus the speedup ratio increases and the running time decreases.  
The author claims that the simulation results show that the proposed 
algorithm is an efficient method for finding locations of irises when the size of 




irises are detected correctly at different illumination levels. The proposed me-
thod is also suitable for detecting the presence or absence of any other object in 
an image. 
4.2.2 Iris Recognition by a Rotation Spreading Neural Network 
The authors present a rotation spreading neural network (R-SAN net) 
[67] [68]. This neural net can recognize the orientation of an object irrespective 
of its shape and its shape irrespective of its orientation. Thus, it is suitable for 
shape and orientation recognition of a concentric circular pattern because it 
uses polar conversion. The authors propose to experiment with R-SAN net to 
simultaneously recognize the orientation and shape of the iris images of people 
who have had their irises registered. 
The input pattern of 300x300 pixels is transformed to polar co-ordinates. 
This transformed pattern is input into the spreading layer and the spread pat-
tern is obtained. In the learning stage, the memory matrix of the orientation 
and shape are obtained by generalized inverse learning. The number of learn-
ing patterns is the product of the number of learning shapes and the number of 
learning orientations.  
The spread image corresponding to the respective spreading weight is 
obtained by multiplication of the transformed image with the spreading weight 
which is the periodic Gaussian curve function predetermined at equal intervals 
in various directions. The spread image is summed in each direction and com-
bined to produce the spread pattern vector. A population vector is created to 




In the recollection stage, the output of orientation recognition neurons 
is obtained by multiplying the spread pattern and orientation memory matrix, 
and the output of shape recognition neurons is obtained by the spread pattern 
and shape memory matrix.  
The recognition experiments were performed in 3 sessions; the number 
of subjects was 3, 5, and 10, respectively. For each subject six iris patterns 
oriented at six orientations were generated from one iris image and these were 
used for learning the R-SAN net. The pupil position was detected using a par-
tial eye template for the eye image taken by a compact close up camera. The 
authors conclude that iris recognition is possible in any arbitrary orientation 
without depending on zoom of the camera. In an experiment with un-learned 
test iris patterns, the R-SAN net combined with minimum distance as the shape 
recognition criterion, perfectly rejected the unregistered iris patterns. 
4.3 Fingerprint Biometric 
Fingerprint identification is the process of comparing given and known 
skin ridge impressions from fingers to determine if the impressions are from 
the same finger, thus identifying or verifying the owner of the given finger-
print. In this section we review representative works describing fingerprint 
biometric, which is by far the most commonly used biometric. 
4.3.1 Fingerprints Classification Using ANNs: A Combined Structural 
and Statistical Approach 
This work [69] describes a fingerprint classification algorithm using 




fication of the fingerprint images by combining both the structural features and 
statistical measure of fingerprint patterns is introduced. Fingerprints are classi-
fied into six categories: arches, tented arches, left loops, right loops, whorls, 
and twin loops. 
After preprocessing and normalization of the fingerprint image, its block direc-
tional image is calculated and is used to extract both statistical and structural features 
required for classification. The classification algorithm consists of four major steps: 
 Compute the block directional image 
 Extract the structural features of the pattern 
 Compute the statistical measures of the pattern 
 Design a multilayer ANN composed of six subnet works for the six fingerprint 
classes and use a multivariate input vector, which is a combination of the structural 
features and statistical measures 
In the first step of calculating the block directional image, the fingerprint image 
is divided into a number of squares and the local orientation is computed in these 
squares. Later on the spurious directions in the block directional image are smoothened. 
A set of horizontal and vertical operators are used iteratively for the smoothening pur-
pose. These block directions of the directional image are converted into binary blocks 
so that the resultant curves can be traced using a line tracing algorithm. 
The transformed block directional image is composed of ones, which act as a 
link between various curves of the pattern. The pattern is scanned from left to right, and 
top to bottom by using a set of feature masks. Each mask is assigned a symbol and each 
connected curve consists of a string of symbols that represent the curve without any 




transformed to map an input vector to the ANN. Every symbol is transformed to a bi-
nary string.  
Method of moments is used to extract the statistical features for a fingerprint 
from its characteristic string, which can be described using a second moment. The Euc-
lidean distance measure is used to measure the distance between the second moment of 
the unknown pattern and mean second moment of each class. A three layer feed for-
ward ANN which has six sub networks (one for each class) is used. The input layer has 
180 independent variables of the binary string and six Euclidean distances; i.e. a total 
of 186 elements. Each subnet is trained independently on its data set by using error 
back propagation learning. 
The database used was the Egyptian Criminal Evidence Fingerprint database, 
which contains 30,000 fingerprints of which 1500 fingerprints of good quality were 
selected. Each subnet was trained on 100 patterns, which carries the characteristics of 
its class.  The authors claim that, in a six class problem the network achieved 95% clas-
sification accuracy, and in a four class problem where whorls and twin loops together 
formed one category, the classification accuracy was 99%. 
4.3.2 Fingerprint Classification by Directional Image Partitioning 
In this work [70], the authors present a new fingerprint classification 
method that uses dynamic masks for directional image partitioning. The au-
thors claim that this approach is translation and rotation invariant and does not 
require the singularities to be detected. The directional image is a discrete ma-
trix whose elements represent the local average directions of the fingerprint 
ridge lines, which summarizes the information contained in the fingerprint pat-




version of the directional image by grouping similar elements into “homoge-
neous” regions is generated, thus eliminating redundancy and giving useful 
synthetic representation that can be exploited for the classification task. 
The authors conduct a literature review on: 
 Syntactic methods, where patterns are described by means of terminal 
symbols and production rules. 
 Approaches based on singularities, where heuristics criteria based on the 
number and position of the singularities are important for classification. 
 Neural approaches, where multilayer perceptrons or Kohonen self organiz-
ing networks are used. 
 Other methods based on geometrical shape, curve fitting and hidden Mar-
kov model classifier. 
 PCASYS approach by NIST, where the feature extraction is done using 
principal component analysis and classification is done by using a probabil-
istic neural network.  
 A structural approach based on relational graphs, where dynamic cluster-
ing algorithms are used to segment the image processed with directional 
masks to create homogenous regions, thus building a relational graph. 
In the new approach, the authors propose a guided segmentation of the 
directional image with the aim of reducing the degrees of freedom during the 
partitioning process. To achieve this, a set of dynamic masks directly derived 
from the most common fingerprint classes are used to guide the partitioning.  




and later on the singularities are strengthened. This image is then partitioned 
using dynamic masks. Dynamic masks are characterized by a set of vertices 
defining the borders of the regions that determine the segmentation. The crea-
tion of prototype masks is thus completed. For each possible fingerprint pat-
tern, at least one well fitting dynamic mask is created. Therefore, the masks are 
derived from the classes of a well known classifier. 
The authors define two methodologies for fingerprint retrieval. The first 
methodology assumes an error free classification, so the search is restricted to 
the database fingerprints resembling analogous classification characteristics. 
The second methodology allows for misclassification to be taken into consider-
ation and the search is carried out incrementally over the whole database. This 
method requires that a human expert terminates the search. For experiments, 
the authors used two databases: 
 Db4: contains 2,000 fingerprints, uniformly distributed in five classes 
 Db14: contains 27,000 fingerprint pairs randomly taken 
The authors conclude that the proposed method is suitable for both 
continuous classification where each fingerprint is characterized with a numer-
ical vector, whose components denote the similarity degree with respect to a 
predefined set of class prototypes, as well as exclusive classification techniques 
where fingerprints are partitioned into some predefined classes according to 
their macro-features. 
4.4 Palm Print Biometric 




teristics of fingerprint recognition. Palm biometrics is represented by the in-
formation presented in a friction ridge impression. This information combines 
ridge flow, ridge characteristics, and ridge structure of the raised portion of the 
epidermis. The data represented by these impressions allows identification or 
authentication of individuals by comparing with a database. In this section, we 
review representative works that describe biometric identification based on 
palm prints. 
4.4.1 Biometric Identification through Hand Geometry Measurements 
The authors present a method [71] in defining and implementing a 
biometric system based on hand geometry identification. Hand features are 
extracted from a color photograph of the user‟s hand. Various pattern recogni-
tion techniques are explored for classification and verification. The authors 
claim up to 97% success rate in classification.  
Hand geometry is appropriate for medium security applications. There 
are certain advantages in using hand geometry as listed below: 
 Medium cost 
 Low computational cost algorithms 
 Low template size 
 Easy and attractive to users, leading to NEARLY null user rejection 
 Lack of relation to police, justice, and criminal records 
The hand geometry identification system presented in this work works 
in two phases:  




and features extracted from them are stored in a central database. 
 The verification phase where a single photograph is taken, and features ex-
tracted from it are compared with the data base. 
The comparison phase can be configured in two ways: 
 As a classifier, where the extracted features are compared with the features 
of all the users‟ templates in the database to recognize the user. 
 As a verifier, where the user states his/her identity and only a particular 
sample belonging to that user is compared. 
The process starts with the image capture of the user‟s palm. The cap-
tured image is a 640x480 pixels color photograph in JPEG format. The image 
also contains a lateral view of the hand due to the placement of a mirror, to be 
able to measure heights. This captured color image is then converted to a black 
and white image. Any deviations due to hand positioning are then corrected by 
resizing or rotating this image. An edge detector, i.e. Sobel function, is applied 
to extract the contour of the hand.  
In the measurement phase, features based on widths of the four fingers, 
the height of the middle finger, little finger, and the palm, inter-finger dis-
tances/deviations and inter-finger angles are extracted. To account for weight 
loss or gain by the user, all distances are taken relative to a determined meas-
ure. 
A total of 31 features are extracted; i.e. 21 widths, 3 heights, 4 deviations 
and 3 angles. Using the Fisher ratio, redundant features were eliminated, and 




For the purpose of classification and verification, the features vectors 
are compared against templates in the database. For this purpose four methods 
were evaluated: 
 Euclidean distance: This is the most common approach of all where Eucli-
dean distances between the user‟s feature vectors and the feature vectors in 
the database are calculated. 
 Hamming distance: Based on the assumption that the feature vector distri-
bution follows the Gaussian distribution, hamming distances are calculated 
for classification. 
 Gaussian mixture models (GMM): A simple probability density function is 
calculated through training to estimate the probability if a sample belongs 
to a class or not. 
 Radial Basis Functions Neural Networks (RBFNN): A two layer neural 
network is trained using the feature vectors from all the users for classifica-
tion purpose. But if it is to be used for a user verification purpose, each user 
has to have his or her own NN, but this NN has to be trained using all the 
feature vectors from all the users in the database. This could be against 
some restrictions. Therefore, the authors consider only a classification 
scheme for the RBFNN.  
The database was created using 10 photographs taken over three 
months of 20 people of different ages, sex, color, profession and living style. 
For enrollment, three to five samples were considered sufficient. Experiments 




thors conclude that in both the approaches, the GMM performed better with 
97% of success for classification and an error rate below 10% for verification. 
Reducing the feature vectors to nine features leads to great loss in success rate. 
The database size used is limited and the authors conclude with a remark on 
conducting further work using a larger database with easier implementation 
approaches to generalize the results obtained. 
4.4.2 Personal Authentication using Palm-Prints Features 
In this work [72], the authors propose a scanner based personal authen-
tication system by using the palm print features. The identification process is 
composed of two stages: enrollment and verification. In the enrollment stage, 
many hand images of an individual are collected and pre-processed for feature 
extraction and creation of a template. In the verification stage, the test sample is 
also pre-processed for feature extraction and then matched with the templates 
to decide whether it is a genuine sample or not. 
The pre-processing is done by image thresholding, border tracing, 
wavelet based segmentation and ROI location. Sobel and other morphological 
operators are used for feature extraction and the reference templates are gener-
ated. In verification, template matching along with back-propagation neural 
nets is used to measure similarity between the reference and test samples.  To 
create the feature vectors, the mean values of pixels in the grids are calculated. 
These values are sequentially arranged row by row to form the feature vectors. 
The authors use three different grid sizes, 32x32, 16x16 and 8x8, to obtain the 




Template matching using the correlation function is used to perform the 
verification task to decide whether the query sample is genuine or not. Also, in 
case of neural nets, a three layer based network that includes a hidden and an 
output layer is used. There are 80, 40, and 1, neurons in each layer respectively. 
To create the database, 30 hand images of each person are obtained 
three times within three weeks. In the enrollment stage, the first 10 images are 
used to train, and 20 other images are used for verification. Implementation 
and coding was done using C and Matlab on a Windows platform. For the 
template matching method, the authors report 91% accuracy rate, whereas for 
the neural network based method, using the back-propagation and scaled con-
jugate gradient algorithm, the authors report 98% accuracy.   
4.5 Facial Biometric 
Face recognition systems work by comparing the acquired facial image 
of an individual with a database to identify or authenticate the individual. In 
this section we review representative works that describe face recognition sys-
tems based on Neural Networks. 
4.5.1 Face Recognition with Radial Basis Function (RBF) Neural 
Networks 
In this work [73], the authors present an efficient design approach for 
the Radial Basis Function Neural Networks (RBFNN) classifier to deal with 
small training sets of high dimension. The face features are first extracted using 
the Principal component analysis (PCA) and then processed with the Fischer 




hybrid algorithm for training the RBFNNs. 
The face recognition problem has the following issues as compared to 
any other pattern classification problem: 
 Over-fitting: If the input dimension for network is comparable to the size of 
the training set, it results in poor generalization. 
 Over-training: High dimension of the network input results in slow con-
vergence. 
 Small Sample Effect: Small samples can easily contaminate the design and 
evaluation of the proposed system. 
 If the number of training patterns is less than the number of features plus 
one, the sample covariance matrix is singular and unusable.  
The proposed method tries to solve the above problems and deals with 
small training sets of high dimensionality. The proposed method consists of the 
following parts: 
 Reducing the number of input variables: Features are extracted using the 
PCA and the dimensionality is reduced using the Fischer‟s linear discrimi-
nator. 
 A new clustering algorithm concerning category information and training 
samples: To avoid undesired and highly dominant averaging phenomenon 
associated with unsupervised learning algorithms, the authors propose us-
ing a supervised clustering algorithm that takes into consideration the cate-
gory information of the training data.  




Majority Criterion: In any class, each datum should have more than 
50% confidence level for the class it belongs to. 
Overlapping Criterion: The key idea of this approach is to consider not 
only the intra-data distribution, but also the inter-data variations. 
The number of inputs is made equal to that of features (i.e., the dimen-
sion of the input space) and the number of outputs to be equal to that of 
classes. 
 A hybrid learning algorithm to train the RBF: The hybrid algorithm com-
bines the gradient and the linear least squares paradigm to adjust the pa-
rameters. 
A total of 300 face images from the ORL database were used. The train-
ing set consisted of 10 images for each of the 30 individuals, selected to 
represent different poses and expressions. Another 300 images were used as 
the testing set. The authors claim that the results demonstrated that the success 
rate of recognition is 100%. 
4.5.2 A State-of-the-Art Neural Network for Robust Face Verification 
In this work [74], the authors propose the use of skin color as an addi-
tional feature for robust face verification. This new feature set is tested on a 
benchmark database, namely XM2VTS, using a simple discriminant artificial 
neural network. 
The bounding box for the face is computed using the coordinates of the 
located eyes, assuming perfect face detection. The face is then cropped and the 




smoothing, the face then becomes a feature vector of dimension 1200. The skin 
color pixels are filtered, from the sub-image corresponding to the extracted 
face, using a look-up table of skin color pixels. For better results, the face 
bounding box should thus avoid as much hair as possible. 
The histograms for RGB pixel components are calculated. These histo-
grams are characteristic to a specific person and also can be used as discrimi-
nant among different people. The illumination during image acquisition is con-
trolled. For each color channel, a histogram is built using 32 discrete bins. 
Hence, the feature vector produced by the concatenation of the histograms (R, 
G, and B) has 96 components. 
For verification, the authors choose Multi-layer perceptrons (MLP). For 
each client, the MLP is trained to classify the input as the given client or an im-
poster. The input to the MLP is a feature vector extracted from the face image 
with or without skin color. The MLP is trained using both client and imposter 
images. 
The database used for this purpose is the multi-modal XM2VTS data-
base, and its associated experimental protocol is the Lausanne Protocol. The 
XM2VTS database contains synchronized image and speech data recorded on 
295 subjects during four sessions taken at one month intervals. On each ses-
sion, two recordings were made, each consisting of a speech shot and a head 
rotation shot. The 295 subjects were divided into a set of 200 clients, 25 evalua-
tion impostors, and 70 test impostors. 




ing 1200 inputs corresponding to the downsized 30x40 gray scale face images 
and an MLP using 1296 inputs corresponding to the same face image and skin 
color. For each client model the training database consisted of 4 images of the 
client and 4 images of the imposter training set. The database was enlarged by 
rotating and scaling these images. These training sets were later divided into 
three subsets, one for training, one for validation and a third as a test set. A 90 
hidden unit MLP was the chosen architecture. The authors conclude that the 
results using the skin color information achieve state-of-the art results and 
have enhanced performance. 
4.5.3 Face Recognition: A Convolution Neural Network Approach 
In this work [75], the authors present a hybrid neural network solution. 
The system combines local image sampling, a self organizing map neural net-
work, and a convolutional neural network.  
The authors present results using the Karhunen-Lo`eve transform in 
place of the self organizing map and a multi layer perceptron in place of the 
convolutional network. The convolutional network extracts larger features in a 
hierarchical set of layers. The authors are interested in face recognition with 
varying facial detail, expression, pose, etc., and do not consider invariance to 
high degree of scaling or rotation.  
Initially, local sampling of the image is done. The authors evaluate two 
methods to perform local sampling: 
 The first method is to create a vector from a local window on the image us-




 The second method creates a representation of the local sample by forming 
a vector out of the intensity of the center pixel and the difference in intensi-
ty between the center pixel and all the other pixels within the square win-
dow. 
A self organizing map (SOM) is trained on the vectors from the pre-
vious stage. The authors also experiment with replacing the SOM with Karhu-
nen-Lo`eve transform. The same window as in the first step is stepped over all 
of the images in the test, and training sets and the generated vectors are passed 
through the SOM at each step, thereby, creating new training and test sets in 
the output space created by self-organizing map. 
A convolutional neural network is trained on the newly created training 
set. The network consists of a set of layers, each of which contains one or more 
planes. Multiple planes are used to detect multiple features. The authors also 
experimented with training a standard multi-layer perceptron for comparison, 
but it resulted in poorer performance since the MLP does not have inbuilt va-
riance to minor translation and local deformation.  
With respect to computational complexity, the SOM takes considerable 
time to train. But the system can be extended to cover new classes without re-
training. It also took considerable time to train the convolutional network. To 
overcome this issue, the author suggests breaking the convolutional block into 
two: the initial feature extraction layer and the final feature extraction and clas-
sification layer. Replacing the second part with another type of classifier such 




when adding new classes.  
On the whole, the self organizing map provides a quantization of the 
image samples into a topological space where inputs that are nearby in the 
original space are also nearby in the output space, which results in invariance 
to minor changes in the image samples. Also the convolution NN provides for 
partial invariance to translation, rotation, scale and deformation. Substituting 
the Karhunen- Lo`eve transform for the self organizing map produced slightly 
worse results. With 5 images per person from the ORL database, the authors 
claim that the proposed method resulted in 3.8% error. 
4.5.4 A Local Global Graph Approach for Facial Expression Recognition 
This work [76] [77] presents a local global graph approach for recogniz-
ing facial expressions from static images irrespective of varying illumination, 
shadows, and cluttered backgrounds. 
Initially a neural network to detect skin in real world images, based on 
color constancy method is presented. Later, the Local-Global Graph (LGG) me-
thod is presented here for detecting faces and facial expressions with a maxi-
mum confidence from skin segmented images. The LGG approach first extracts 
the most important facial features and then inter-relates them for face and fa-
cial expressions; i.e., combining local information with the global information. 
Facial expression recognition from the detected face images is obtained by 
comparing the LG expression graphs with the existing LG expression models 
present in the LGG database.  




illumination conditions. First, the images are color corrected based on the illu-
minant estimate of the NN. The skin regions in the NN stabilized images are 
then detected using a simple threshold operation. The advantage of the NN 
method for color adaptation is that it does not have any inherent assumptions 
about the object surfaces in the image or the illumination sources as the input 
to the network is only the color from the image.  
Initially, the NN is trained so as to adapt to the skin color using random 
images from a database consisting of images collected under various illumina-
tion conditions both indoor and outdoor, and containing skin colors of differ-
ent ethnic groups. The color correction step assigns achromatic (gray) to skin 
pixels. The second skin detection stage classifies the skin and non skin pixels 
using a threshold based on the achromatic value of the color corrected images.  
It should be noted that building an accurate classifier which can detect 
all the skin types under all possible illuminations, shadows, cluttered back-
grounds and makeup, using visible spectrum is still an unsolved question.  
Local region graph (Facial Feature Region Graph): A local graph is 
built to encode the spatial relationships of the line segments that are a result of 
a curve fitting procedure on the segmented regions produced by the neural 
network. Each facial region is represented by a local graph, and to identify the 
segmented regions as facial regions, we need to match the local graph of the 
segmented regions to the stored model local graphs in the database. 
It is also important to identify the geometrical positions and placements 




Voronoi Tessellation method, the Delaunay triangulation, and the Local-Global 
graphs as the basic representation of the image structure. Matching two graphs 
comprises of establishing point correspondences between two graphs node sets 
that maximizes the likelihood between two graphs, given the spatial con-
straints. The extra step needed for recognizing facial expressions is that we 
need to compare the image LG graph with the existing expression LG graphs.  
The proposed LGG method does not require any training samples. The 
graph method is invariant to scale, rotations, to a certain extent, to pose, and is 
shown to perform robustly under various illumination conditions when com-
bined with the neural constancy based skin detection. Five facial features are 
used to represent an expression and the authors propose to use other features 
such as furrows and cheeks, and also indicate facial motion during an expres-
sion.  
4.5.5 Comparison of Neural Network Algorithms for Face Recognition 
The authors present a comparison of neural methods of recognizing 
faces using three different compression techniques, namely, wavelets, mo-
ments, and F-CORE coefficients [78]. Different types of faces were used as in-
puts: normal with different facial expressions, clear of noise and noise conta-
minated, smiling and serious ones, as well as effects of occlusion or missing 
parts of the faces were considered. 
The images were obtained from different individuals with a JVC cam-
corder. The images were saved in a TGA format. With custom made software, 




further compressed by several methods. The compression was done in order to 
extract features that could be used as inputs to a NN. Before compression took 
place, some processing was also done on the images to normalize the data for 
better comparisons later on. Since the images were taken under different lu-
minance and background conditions, a masking process is used to segment the 
face from its background.  
F-CORE Method: The Fourier based Compression Reconstruction tech-
nique was developed by Micheli-Tzanakou and Binge. After performing the 
DFT and finding the power spectrum of an image, it sorts the coefficients from 
maximum to minimum. Once this is accomplished, a user selectable percent of 
these coefficients is stored along with their co-ordinates in the power spectrum. 
The rest of the coefficients are set to zero. If the reconstruction is desired, the 
saved coefficients are put back in the original position and the so formed pow-
er spectrum is used in an inverse DFT. The image so formed is then used as a 
first “guess” of an image that is refined to perfection by algebraic reconstruc-
tion techniques. In order to do that, the sums of each column and of each row 
in the image are also saved. A multiplicative algebraic technique is used until 
perfection of the image is achieved. 
Invariant Moments: The system has been designed for the representa-
tion of grayscale images by invariant moments. A set of moments is computed 
that are invariant to translation, rotation and scaling so these can be used as 
inputs to a neural network for the recognition of human faces from various im-




known as Hu‟s moments.  
Using a 2D continuous function f(x,y), moment of order (p+q) is de-
fined as: 
mpq =  dxdyyxfyx
qp ),(  
for p = 0, 1, 2, 3, ….. and q = 0, 1, 2, 3, …..  
Correspondingly, the central moments can be defined as: 
µpq =   dxdyyxfyyxx
qp ),()'()'(  
Here, x‟ = m10/ m00 and y‟ = m01/ m00.  
The third order central moments are calculated and normalized. From 
these normalized central moments, the seven invariant moments are com-
puted.  
Wavelet Decomposition: The principal drawback with Fourier Trans-
forms is its inability to analyze a signal locally. To overcome this, wavelet 
transform is used and is built by dilating and translating a unique function 
g(x). This decomposition defines an orthogonal multi-resolution representation 
called a wavelet representation. It is computed with a pyramidal algorithm based 
on convolutions with quadrature mirror filters. A wavelet transform can be in-
terpreted as decomposition into a set of frequency channels having the same 
bandwidth on a logarithmic scale. The resolution of the wavelet transform va-
ries with scale parameter. Large scale implies coarse resolution in spatial do-
main and fine in frequency domain, whereas small scale implies coarse resolu-




composition is critically sampled, i.e. number of samples in the representation 
is equal to the number of samples in the signal. This allows one to violate the 
Nyquist Criteria without discarding information. The 2D images of the pre-
processed faces are subjected to a wavelet analysis. The wavelet transform is 
















where g(t) is the wavelet prototype, corresponding to scale q and posi-
tion, or space, p.  
Neurocomputing: The architecture or interconnection schemes em-
ployed by neural network designs is varied as the applications, although some 
have seen a special concentration through the years. Two types of training are 
commonly seen: supervised and unsupervised. In supervised learning, there 
exists information about the correct solution (desired transformation) of the 
network for each example pattern presented to it. In unsupervised learning, no 
a priori information about the desired transformation exists, and the training 
must be solely based on the properties of the patterns. The author comments 
that it is better to begin thinking of neuron-computing as an alternative to the 
many years of sequentially dominated processing. Neural networks are a spe-
cialized form of parallel distributed processing (PDP) systems, and can be use-
ful as a machine, but they must be looked at as a machine and not as a biologi-




Feature Extraction: A good feature extraction routine will compress the 
input space to a lower dimensionality while still maintaining a large portion of 
the information contained in the original pattern space. In unsupervised situa-
tions, the only information available to the feature extraction module is the sta-
tistical distribution of the patterns. In such a scenario, it is impossible to quanti-
tatively analyze the effectiveness of a feature extraction routine in improving 
pattern classification. However, there are operators designed to maintain high 
information content in the features (as compared to the original measurement 
pattern) with a minimal number of dimensions. For a classification problem, 
the operator‟s input to the network is a feature vector, whereas the outputs are 
represented so that one output node per class or template is assigned, and for a 
feature vector from class I the desired output is shown for one neuron being 
ON while the rest of the output neurons are OFF.  
Multi-layer Perceptron: Common network architectures consist of mul-
tiple layers of neurons, where each neuron in layer 1 is connected to all neu-
rons in layer 2. The input layer receives external stimuli and the output layer 
generates the output of the network. The hidden layer and all the interconnec-
tions are responsible for the neuron-computation. As the number of neurons 
increases, problem complexity increases as does the time to train the network. 
Only after training is the network capable of performing the task it was de-
signed to do.  
The Back Propagation Algorithm: The back propagation is a learning 




the weights. The algorithm is a gradient descent method that minimizes the 
error between the desired output and the actual output calculated by the MLP. 
The gradient descent method updates an arbitrary weight, w, in the network 
by the following rule: 
w(n+1) = w(n) + ∆w(n) 
where ,  ∆w(n) = -k (∂E/∂w(n)) 
where „n‟ is the iteration number and „k‟ is a scaling constant. 
There are many variations to the basic algorithm that have been pro-
posed to speed the convergence of the system. Convergence is defined as a re-
duction in the over all error below a minimum threshold. It is the point at 
which the network is said to be fully trained. One method used in this article is 
the inclusion of momentum term in the update equation as shown below: 
w(n+1) = w(n) -k (∂E/∂w(n)) + a∆w(n) 
where „k‟ is the learning rate and is taken as 0.25 and „a‟ is a constant 
momentum term.  
The ALOPEX algorithm: The ALOPEX process is an optimization pro-
cedure that has been successfully demonstrated in a wide variety of applica-
tions. It incorporates a stochastic element to avoid local extremes in search of 
the global optimum of the cost function. The cost function is problem depen-
dent and is generally a function of a large number of parameters. ALOPEX ite-
ratively updates all parameters simultaneously based on cross-correlation of 
local changes, ∆Xi, and the global response change ∆R, plus an additive noise.  




ing to the equation  
Xi = Xi(n-1) + ¥∆Xi(n)∆R + ri (n) 
The basic concept is that this cross-correlation provides a direction of 
movement for the next iteration. The general ALOPEX updating equation is 
explained as follows.  Xi(n) are the parameters to be updated, „n‟ is the iteration 
number, and R() is the cost function, of which the best solution in terms of Xi is 
sought. Gamma, ¥, is a scaling constant, ri (n) is a random number from a 
Gaussian distribution whose mean and standard deviation are varied and 
∆Xi(n) and ∆R are found by: 
∆Xi = Xi(n-1) - Xi(n-2) 
R(n) = R(n-1) – R(n-2) 
The calculation of R(n) is problem dependent and can be modified easi-
ly. Additional constraints include a maximal change permitted for Xi, for one 
iteration. This bounded step size prevents the algorithm from drastic changes 
from one iteration to the next. These drastic changes often lead to long periods 
of oscillations without convergence. 
Results: 
After pre-processing, the feature vectors are fed to the NN as inputs. 
Several options were used, such as the performance of effectiveness of the fea-
tures used, the convergence of the algorithms, their recognition ability as well 
as their performance on noisy and incomplete images. All the three methods of 
compression converge to the same level eventually but the wavelets seem to 




When the NN was tested with the images used in training, recognition 
for ALOPEX was 99%. The training with back-propagation was inferior and so 
was its testing. Also, the number of iterations that back-propagation needed for 
convergence was much higher than the ones needed for ALOPEX. Features al-
so played an important role in the recognition rate of the Neural Network. For 
tilted and smiling faces or profiles, invariant moments performed better. The F-
CORE co-efficients were most robust to noise and partially occluded faces.  
4.6 Combining Biometric Techniques 
Combining two or more biometric technologies yields better perfor-
mance and reliability, reducing false rejections and false acceptance rates by the 
biometric systems. In this section we review representative works that describe 
combining two biometric technologies. 
4.6.1 Fusion of Face and Speech Data for Person Identity Verification 
Identity authentication task is a binary classification problem: reject or 
accept identity claim. Combining/fusing information based on a different 
modality like speech, face, and/or fingerprint increases the performance and 
robustness of identity authentication systems. In this work [79], the authors 
propose to evaluate different binary classification schemes like support vector 
machine, multilayer perceptrons, C4.5 decision tree, Fisher‟s linear discrimi-
nant and Bayesian classifier, to carry on the fusion. The authors concentrate on 
the biometric identity verification problem, where the user states his or her 




The first method investigated is the elastic graph matching (EGM) me-
thod. Each face is represented by a set of feature vectors positioned on nodes of 
a coarse, rectangular grid placed on the image. As features, the modulus of 
complex Gabor responses from filters with six orientations and three resolu-
tions are used. Comparing two faces corresponds to matching and adapting a 
grid taken from one image to the features of the other image, taking into ac-
count both the feature vectors of each node and the deformation information 
attached to the edges. The matching is done in two steps, initially a rigid 
matching is performed and then this rigidly matched grid is deformed to mi-
nimize the distances between the reference and input feature vectors. The con-
tributions from each node are considered equally, which may be of disadvan-
tage since the contributions of each node to the distance are different. 
The second method investigated is the speaker verification method. 
Both text-dependent and text-independent methods are investigated.  
In the text-independent speaker verification, liner prediction cepstral 
co-efficients are calculated from the audio signal. The 12 LPC coefficients along 
with the signal energy yield the 13 dimensional feature vector. Covariance ma-
trix for these features is calculated, and during testing the covariance matrix for 
the input signals is calculated, and their arithmetic harmonic sphericity meas-
ure is used as similarity measure.   
In the case of text-dependent speaker verification, Hidden Markov 
Models (HMM) are explored. When a user claims a certain identity, the HMM 




vector being generated by the client, i.e., the true claimed identity. Similarly, 
the HMM modeling the world (or impostors) will be used to compute the like-
lihood of the feature vector being generated by an impostor. The decision is 
then made by comparing the likelihood ratio to a predefined threshold. All 
models were trained based on the maximum likelihood criterion using the 
Baum–Welch algorithm and verified using the Viterbi algorithm to calculate 
the likelihood. 
Having computed the match using the above methods, a verification 
decision is made based on the fusion of the above computed results. For classi-
fication purposes, the following methods are evaluated: 
Support vector machines: The Support Vector Machine is based on the 
structural risk minimization. Better generalization capabilities are achieved 
through a minimization of the bound on the generalization error. The computa-
tional complexity of the SVM during the training depends on the number of 
data points rather than on their dimensionality. At the run time, the classifica-
tion is a simple weighted sum. 
Minimum cost Bayesian classifier: The results from distributed detec-
tion and distributed estimation are used, since the data from multi-sensors is 
used. This multimodal person authentication problem reduces to using the 
Bayesian classifiers. The quality of the probability fusion and decision models 
depends on the modeling of the likelihood function. 
Fisher’s linear discriminant: The Fischer linear discriminator maximiz-




C4.5 decision trees: In a decision tree, at each node a test on a particular 
attribute of the data is performed. The path of the root node to a particular leaf 
is then a series of tests on the attributes that classifies the data to the class de-
fined by the particular leaf. 
Multilayer perceptron: A multi layer perceptron with 1 hidden layer is 
used for classification purpose. The hidden layer is composed of 10 hidden 
units. Training will be performed with the classical back propagation algo-
rithm. 
To achieve fair evaluation of the different approaches, the authors com-
pared the performance of different fusion schemes on a large database of 295 
subjects with a specified testing protocol. Among the evaluated classifiers men-
tioned above, the authors claim that the SVM- polynomial and the Bayesian 
classifiers gave the best results, therefore outperforming the single modalities. 
In the case of the Bayesian classifier, data modeling is necessary, whereas the 
SVM technique does not assume any particular data distribution. 
4.6.2 Combining Face and Iris Biometrics for Identity Verification 
The authors present two different strategies for fusing face and iris clas-
sifiers [80]. The first method is to compute a weighted and/or un-weighted 
sum to be compared with a threshold, and the second method is to use distance 
measure of the feature vectors on classifiers like Fischer discriminator or Neur-
al networks with radial basis functions.  
The accuracy of face recognition is affected by illumination, pose and 




ity so that poor quality images are rejected. Also, an iris, can change over time, 
i.e., due to diseases. 
Some of the above problems can only be solved, or at least their impact 
reduced, by fusing several biometric identification systems, such as face and 
iris recognizers. The advantage in fusing various modalities of biometric data is 
that people with specific disabilities will be able to use the biometric identifica-
tion system.  
Among the face recognition techniques, appearance based approaches 
are the most popular. For example, PCA, ICA and LDA i.e. using Eigen face 
method as face matcher. In case of iris verification, dyadic wavelets are used 
are used to filter the acquired iris image.  
In the weighted sum method for fusion of data, since the performance 
of different classifiers is different, it is necessary to use different weights to 
combine the individual classifiers. In case of the Fisher Discriminant analysis, 
the face and iris matcher outputs are treated as feature vector X = (x1, x2), and 
known classifiers are used to determine the separation boundary. In case of the 
RBFNN, since it is a verification problem, every subject has his or her own 
neural network. The feature vectors (x1, x2) are fed to the NN for classification.  
Two databases were created. The first database consisted of 2,096 iris 
images corresponding to 210 subjects, captured by an iris acquisition system 
developed at NLPR. There are at least 5 images for one eye. Iris images of left 
and right eyes are known to be different. Since not every individual provided 




The images were acquired during two different sessions, one month apart. 
The second database was created to illustrate the enrollment failure and 
its effect on the overall verification accuracy by using some of the poor quality 
iris images that would normally be rejected in an operational iris verification 
system. Forty subjects and 400 iris images, (10 images per subject) were used. 
In case of database 1, the performance of the fusion is worse than the 
performance of the iris standalone system except for the weighted sum rule. In 
case of database 2, which includes some poor quality iris images that will be 
rejected by an operational iris verification system, the images are accepted and 
correctly classified by the fused classifier, which means that the enrollment 
failure rate can be decreased by fusion while maintaining a high accuracy. 
4.7 Comparative Survey 
In this section, we set up comparative survey tables to compare the var-
ious methods reviewed above along with three more biometric authentication 
methodologies that are further presented in this dissertation. 
4.7.1 Comparative Survey Tables 
In Table 4-1 all methodologies are listed. In each cell a “1” is designated 
if this feature is available or a “0” is designated if this feature is not available. 
In Table 4-2 for each feature, a weight is assigned which reflects its importance 
from the user‟s view (weights table). For example, computational complexity is 
much more important to the engineer as compared to the user, because coding, 




the lesser the computational complexity, the easier it is to code and implement 
the software. 
We grade each methodology, if possible, with a value (xi) between 1 
and 10 (scores table). If we don‟t grade one characteristic, we make it 0, which 
means that the characteristic is not available or we don‟t have enough informa-
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  , a total score of 
each methodology is calculated, where „i‟ refers to a specific characteristic, N is 
the total number of characteristics for each system and „b‟ is bias (for now, 
b=0). 
Below are some examples to show how the weights are assigned in the 
tables.  
Method Complexity: Highest Complexity – 10, Least Complexity – 1 
Invasive: Highly Invasive – 10, Non-Invasive – 1 
Product: Product – 10, Not a Product – 1 
Training/Pre-processing: High training time – 10, Low training time – 1 
Computational Requirements: High – 10, Low – 1 
Similarly, the rest of the scores are assigned with 10 standing for high-
est score and 1 standing for the lowest score applicable for that feature. The 
methods with their abbreviations are given in Table 4-1. The features with their 






Table 4-1. List of Surveyed Biometric Methodologies 
METHOD ABBREVIATION 
Speaker Verification by Means of ANNs M1 
Biometric identification through hand geometry measurements M2 
Fast Iris Detection for Personal Verification Using Modular 
Neural Nets 
M3 
Fusion of Face and Speech Data for Person Identity Verification M4 
Combining Face and Iris Biometrics for Identity Verification M5 
Face Recognition with Radial Basis Function (RBF) Neural 
Networks 
M6 
A State-of-the-Art Neural Network for Robust Face Verification M7 
Fingerprints classification using artificial neural networks: a 
combined structural and statistical approach 
M8 
Personal authentication using palm-prints features M9 
Speaker-specific mapping for text-independent speaker recogni-
tion 
M10 
Neural Network for improved text-independent speaker identifi-
cation 
M11 
Fingerprint Classification by directional image partitioning M12 
Iris Recognition by a rotation spreading neural network M13 
Face Recognition: A convolution Neural Network Approach M14 
A local Global Graph Approach for Facial Expression Recogni-
tion (includes An ANN based approach for image chromatic 
adaptation for skin color detection) 
M15 
Speaker Identification Using Neural Networks and Wavelets M16 
Comparison of Neural Network Algorithms for Face Recognition M17 
Iris Biometric Authentication based on Local Global Graphs: An 
FPGA Implementation 
M18 
An FPGA implementation of the Local Global Graph based 
Voice Biometric Authentication 
M19 
Local Global Graph based Fingerprint Biometric Authentication M20 
Table 4-2. Features Table for Biometric Methodologies 
F1 Simplicity The methodology is simple. 
F2 Complexity 
The number of operations to be performed by the methodology for achieving 
the desirable solution. 
F3 Originality 
The methodology is based on original algorithms and or mathematical formu-
las or the synergistic combination of simple methods composing a new origi-
nal method. 




The methodology can be implemented in real-time. It can produce results as 
soon as the input data is fed to the methodology. 















Test on Real Cases 
Sufficient results and performance statistics are presented to back up metho-
dology’s efficiency on real cases. 
F10 Reliability The methodology produces reliable results. 




The methodology requires extra time for preprocessing the data set (i.e. NN 
training). 
F13 Cost The amount of money needed for the purchase or usage of the methodology. 
F14 Invasive 
The methodology requires a preprocessing stage, such as a surgical operation, 
in order to produce its results. 








The methodology has the potential of further enhancement. 
F18 Implementation The methodology has already been implemented in a useable environment. 
F19 Prototype 
The methodology has been successfully implemented at the experimental 
stage and produced desirable results. 
Table 4-3. Feature v/s Methodology Table for Biometric Methodologies 
 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15 F16 F17 F18 F19 
M1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
M2 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 X 1 1 1 1 
M3 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
M4 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
M5 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
M6 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 X 1 1 1 1 
M7 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 X 1 1 1 1 
M8 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 X 1 1 1 1 
M9 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 X 1 1 1 1 
M10 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
M11 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
M12 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 X 1 1 1 1 
M13 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
M14 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 X 1 1 1 1 




M16 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
M17 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 X 1 1 1 1 
M18 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
M19 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
M20 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Table 4-4. Weights Table (Biometric Methodologies) 
 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15 F16 F17 F18 F19 
USER'S PERSPEC-
TIVE 
2 1 1 10 9 10 1 10 10 10 10 3 2 10 10 10 9 9 9 
ADMINISTRATOR'S 
PERSPECTIVE 
7 1 1 10 9 10 1 8 10 10 10 3 9 7 10 8 9 9 9 
ENGINEER'S 
PERSPECTIVE 
9 10 7 10 9 10 10 8 10 10 10 9 7 8 10 7 10 9 9 
AVERAGE 6 4 3 10 9 10 4 8.7 10 10 10 5 6 8.3 10 8.3 9.3 9 9 
Table 4-5. Scores Table (Biometric Methodologies) 
 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15 F16 F17 F18 F19 Total 
Final 
Total 
M1 7 8 5 7 8 0 8 9 7 6 6 9 0 1 7 9 7 7 8 929.4 48.92 
M2 8 6 6 8 9 0 6 7 7 6 6 7 0 1 7 6 8 6 8 889.4 46.81 
M3 7 7 6 8 9 0 7 8 8 9 8 8 0 1 8 6 7 8 8 983.8 51.78 
M4 6 8 7 7 8 0 9 7 7 6 6 9 0 1 9 8 7 8 8 936.7 49.3 
M5 6 8 7 7 8 0 8 8 8 8 9 9 0 1 9 7 6 8 8 983.8 51.78 
M6 7 7 6 6 8 0 7 7 7 6 6 8 0 1 7 7 7 7 8 875.4 46.07 
M7 7 7 6 7 8 0 8 7 7 6 6 8 0 1 7 7 7 7 8 889.4 46.81 
M8 6 8 7 8 9 0 8 8 8 8 8 8 0 1 8 6 8 8 8 988.1 52.01 
M9 8 7 6 8 8 0 6 7 7 6 6 7 0 1 6 6 8 6 8 874.4 46.02 
M10 7 7 8 8 8 0 7 9 7 6 7 8 0 1 7 9 7 7 8 945.4 49.76 
M11 7 7 5 7 8 0 7 9 6 6 6 8 0 1 7 9 7 7 8 906.4 47.71 
M12 7 8 6 8 8 0 8 8 8 8 8 8 0 1 8 6 8 8 8 982.1 51.69 




M14 6 7 7 6 7 0 8 7 6 6 7 7 0 1 7 7 7 7 8 862.4 45.39 
M15 7 8 8 7 7 0 8 7 6 6 7 6 0 1 7 7 7 7 8 880.4 46.34 
M16 7 7 8 7 8 0 7 9 6 6 7 7 0 1 7 7 7 7 8 903.8 47.57 
M17 7 7 8 7 8 0 7 7 7 6 6 7 0 1 7 7 7 7 8 886.4 46.65 
M18 7 7 9 6 8 0 7 8 9 9 9 7 0 1 8 6 7 8 8 978.8 51.51 
M19 7 8 9 7 8 0 8 9 7 6 6 9 0 1 7 9 7 7 8 941.4 49.54 
M20 6 8 9 8 9 0 8 8 8 8 8 8 0 1 8 6 8 8 8 994.1 52.32 
Table 4-6. Weights from Table 4-4 (Biometric Methodologies) 
Features F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 F12 F13 F14 F15 F16 F17 F18 F19 
weights 6 4 3 10 9 10 4 8.7 10 10 10 5 6 8.3 10 8.3 9.3 9 9 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
In the previous sections we provided a comparative study on neural 
nets based biometric methodologies from a selective set of works. We also set 
up a comparative survey tables to compare the various works and methods 
that we reviewed. We find that iris scan and fingerprint scan offer the better 
performance as compared to face, voice, and palm print based biometrics. We 
also see that combined biometrics yield better results as compared to relying on 
just one biometric measure. It is also important to mention here that our com-
parative study does not intend to identify one or more methods as better than 
others, which requires running these methods under the same conditions or on 
the same data sets, but to indicate the status of the current performance of these 




5 CHAPTER FIVE 
In this chapter, we present the SCAN-SP architecture with respect to its 
biometric authentication capabilities. The FPGA based co-processor architec-
ture to implement iris, voice and fingerprint based biometric authentication is 
presented along with the new instruction set to handle the off-chip co-
processor. Further, we describe the Local-Global (LG) Graph methodology 
based iris, voice and fingerprint biometric authentication. 
5.1 SCAN-SP Architecture – Biometric Capabilities 
In this section, we describe the FPGA co-processor interface along with 
new instructions to implement iris, voice and fingerprint based biometric au-
thentication. The new instructions enable the operation of the FPGA based co-
processor to implement the above mentioned operations.  A tightly coupled 
coprocessor architecture with dedicated data-path and a local memory system 
is required. The coprocessor interacts with the main processor through asyn-
chronous FIFOs which enable the coprocessor to be implemented with a clock 
frequency different from the processor system. The coprocessor is integrated 
into the processor subsystem using a dedicated coprocessor interface as shown 
in Fig.5-1. A dedicated coprocessor interface provides higher data rate between 
processor cache and the coprocessor and provides special purpose instructions 






Fig. 5-1. FPGA Co-processor Interface for Biometric Authentication 
Data transfer across the external memory and the coprocessor memory 
is implemented by transferring four bytes of data simultaneously on the 32 bit 
data bus. The four bytes on the data bus are decrypted using the SCAN metho-
dology and the XOR key before being stored in the coprocessor memory. Simi-
larly the four bytes are encrypted using the SCAN methodology and the XOR 
key before being stored in the external memory. The new coprocessor instruc-





ACQUIRE_IRIS – The acquire iris biometric (ACQUIRE_IRIS) instruc-
tion moves the acquired iris biometric into the co-processor memory.  
ACQUIRE_VOICE – The acquire voice biometric (ACQUIRE_VOICE) 
instruction moves the acquired speech signal into the co-processor memory. 
ACQUIRE_FINGERPRINT – The acquire fingerprint biometric (AC-
QUIRE_FINGERPRINT) instruction moves the acquired fingerprint biometric 
into the co-processor memory. 
EXTRACT_LG_IRIS – The extract local-global graph from iris biometric 
(EXTRACT_LG_IRIS) instruction extracts the local-global graph from the ac-
quired iris biometric present in the co-processor memory. The acquired iris 
biometric should be present in the co-processor memory before this instruction 
is executed. The output of this instruction, i.e., the LG graph of the iris biome-
tric is stored in the co-processor memory. 
EXTRACT_LG_VOICE – The extract local-global graph from voice bio-
metric (EXTRACT_LG_VOICE) instruction extracts the local-global graph from 
the acquired voice biometric present in the co-processor memory. The acquired 
voice biometric should be present in the co-processor memory before this in-
struction is executed. The output of this instruction, i.e., the LG graph of the 
voice biometric is stored in the co-processor memory. 
EXTRACT_LG_FINGERPRINT – The extract local-global graph from 
fingerprint biometric (EXTRACT_LG_FINGERPRINT) instruction extracts the 




processor memory. The acquired fingerprint biometric should be present in the 
co-processor memory before this instruction is executed. The output of this in-
struction, i.e., the LG graph of the fingerprint biometric is stored in the co-
processor memory. 
STORE_LG_IRIS – The store local-global graph for iris biometric 
(STORE_LG_IRIS) instruction removes the extracted local-global graph for the 
iris biometric from the co-processor memory and stores it in the external mem-
ory. 
STORE_LG_VOICE – The store local-global graph for voice biometric 
(STORE_LG_VOICE) instruction removes the extracted local-global graph for 
the voice biometric from the co-processor memory and stores it in the external 
memory. 
STORE_LG_FINGERPRINT – The store local-global graph for finger-
print biometric (STORE_LG_ FINGERPRINT) instruction removes the ex-
tracted local-global graph for the fingerprint biometric from the co-processor 
memory and stores it in the external memory. 
LOAD_LG_IRIS – The load local-global graph for iris biometric 
(LOAD_LG_IRIS) instruction moves the local-global graph for iris biometric 
from external memory into the coprocessor memory. 
LOAD_LG_VOICE – The load local-global graph for voice biometric 
(LOAD_LG_VOICE) instruction moves the local-global graph for voice biome-
tric from external memory into the coprocessor memory. 




biometric (LOAD_LG_ FINGERPRINT) instruction moves the local-global 
graph for fingerprint biometric from external memory into the coprocessor 
memory. 
AUTHEN_LG_IRIS – The authenticate local-global graph for iris biome-
tric (AUTHEN_LG_IRIS) instruction  compares the local-global graph extracted 
from the acquired iris biometric with the local-global graph of the iris biometric 
already present in the co-processor memory. The output of this instruction is a 
binary value, 0 indicating rejection and 1 indicating acceptance of the identity 
claim based on the presented iris biometric. 
AUTHEN_LG_VOICE – The authenticate local-global graph for voice 
biometric (AUTHEN_LG_VOICE) instruction  compares the local-global graph 
extracted from the acquired voice biometric with the local-global graph of the 
voice biometric already present in the co-processor memory. The output of this 
instruction is a binary value, 0 indicating rejection and 1 indicating acceptance 
of the identity claim based on the presented voice biometric. 
AUTHEN_LG_FINGERPRINT – The authenticate local-global graph for 
fingerprint biometric (AUTHEN_LG_ FINGERPRINT) instruction  compares 
the local-global graph extracted from the acquired fingerprint biometric with 
the local-global graph of the fingerprint biometric already present in the co-
processor memory. The output of this instruction is a binary value, 0 indicating 
rejection and 1 indicating acceptance of the identity claim based on the pre-





5.2 LG Graph based Iris Biometric Authentication 
Iris recognition is a method of biometric authentication that uses pat-
tern recognition techniques based on high-resolution images of the iris. Iris 
scan based security systems offer robust and reliable authentication as com-
pared to other biometric methodologies. In this section, we present a biometric 
authentication system based on iris scan, i.e., the identity claimed by the sub-
ject is verified by comparing his (or her) iris biometric against a database. A 
unique Local-Global graph methodology to extract, store and compare iris pat-
terns for the purpose of authentication is presented. Local features from the iris 
image are first extracted and then combined to form a Global graph that is 
stored in the system database. Authenticity is established by comparing the 
Global graph of the presented iris image with the Global graph of the stored 
reference image. Comparison is done by calculating the distance between the 
two Global graphs and based on a threshold, the authenticity is established.  
LG graph methodology is a computationally intensive process as it in-
volves executing feature extraction algorithm repeatedly over the input image. 
Further, comparison of the test and reference graphs, if implemented in soft-
ware will consume expensive clock cycles, thus increasing the authentication 
time. Therefore, a hardware implementation of these critical sections, namely 
feature extraction and graph comparison is necessary to enable real-time au-
thentication. Although, iris based biometric authentication has been extensively 
researched, it is still an active research area owing to increasing security and 




methodology as an incremental methodology for efficiently representing iris 
patterns via their features and the features‟ relationships. 
5.2.1 Pre-processing the Iris Image 
Pre-processing the acquired iris image is necessary before the applica-
tion of LG graph methodology to extract the iris features. Pre-processing con-
sists of four major steps: (1) Iris localization, (2) Image smoothing, (3) Log-polar 
transformation and (4) Image segmentation. These steps are elaborated further 
in this section. 
5.2.1.1 Iris localization 
Along with the region of interest, i.e., iris, the acquired image also con-
tains pupil, parts of the sclera and other camera artifacts, as seen in Fig 5-2a. 
Therefore, prior to feature extraction, the location of the iris must be estab-
lished in the acquired image. For the purpose of iris localization, the first step is 
to find the edges in the acquired iris image. Optimal edge detection algorithms 
like the Canny edge detector can be used to obtain continuous edges. The out-
put of the edge detection process is a binary image highlighting the detected 
edges. Once the edge detection is completed, Hough Transform is applied to 
detect the circles in the binary edge image, as shown in Fig 5-2b. The Hough 
transform can be used to determine the parameters of a circle when a number 
of points that fall on the circle‟s perimeter are known. A circle with radius R 
and center (a, b) can be described with the parametric equations: 
x = a + Rcos(Ф) 




When the angle Ф sweeps through the full 360 degree range, the points 
(x, y) trace the perimeter of a circle. The detection of the circle highlights the 
location of the pupil. A circular mask is created with the centre of the pupil as 
the centre of the circular mask, as seen in Fig 5-2c. The radius of the circular 
mask is pre-determined and is expected to be an inherent characteristic of the 
iris image acquisition system. The acquired iris image is then overlaid with the 
circular mask as seen in Fig 5-2d. The circular mask highlights only the iris 
while masking the pupil, parts of the sclera and other camera artifacts. Iris loca-
lization using Hough transforms is elaborated further in [95]. An FPGA im-
plementation of Hough transforms is presented in [99]. 
   
                                  (a)                                    (b) 
  
                                   (c)                                     (d) 
Fig. 5-2. (a)Acquired iris image (b) Edge image (c) Circular mask (d)Localization of iris 




The next step is to smooth the localized iris image. Image smoothing is 
necessary to eliminate trivial regions that can appear in the segmented iris im-
age. Image segmentation is the last but critical step in pre-processing the iris 
image prior to application of the LG graph methodology. These trivial regions 
appear as spurious regions in the segmented image leading to unreliable re-
sults during comparison of test and reference iris images. A simple averaging 
filter of size 3x3 or 5x5 can be selected for smoothing the iris image. It is noted 
that over-smoothing the image using a bigger window kernel will result in loss 
of information and improper segmentation. Hardware implementation of im-
age filtering operations, a smoothing filter in our case, is described in [101]. 
5.2.1.3 Log-Polar transformation 
After smoothing the iris image, log-polar transformation is applied on 
the smoothed iris image. The log-polar transformation is a conformal mapping 
from the points on the Cartesian plane to points in the log-polar plane. Log-
polar representation of an image has three notable advantages over its Carte-
sian counterpart. The first advantage of application of the log-polar transfor-
mation is data reduction. The second advantage of the log-polar geometry is 
that objects occupying the central high resolution part of the visual field be-
come dominant over coarsely sampled background elements in the image pe-
riphery, thus embedding an implicit focus of attention in the center of the visu-
al field. The third advantage is that image rotation in Cartesian plane results in 
translational shifts in the log-polar plane. Thus, the application of log-polar 




mentation eliminates redundant information and increases focus on features 
necessary for implementing the LG graph methodology. Fig 5-3 shows the log-
polar transformation of the localized and smoothed iris image. The mapping 
from Cartesian plane to the log-polar plane can be easily implemented using a 
Look-up Table. A reconfigurable implementation of the log-polar transforma-
tion of the iris image is presented in [97].  
 
Fig. 5-3. Log-Polar Transformation after Iris Localization 
5.2.1.4 Image segmentation 
Once we obtain the log-polar transformed image, the final step in the 
pre-processing stage is image segmentation. Segmentation is a crucial part of 
the algorithm because the LG graph representation directly depends on the re-
sults of segmentation. The segmentation algorithm must incorporate invariance 
to noise and rotation in the presented test image. Invariance to noise and rota-
tion means that the segmentation results should consistently produce the same 




permissible amount of noise or rotation is incorporated in the image. If the 
segmentation algorithm is not invariant to noise and rotation, the number and 
sizes of the segments (or regions) will differ and formation of the LG graphs 
will not be reliable resulting in inaccurate authentication. Thus we require a 
robust segmentation method to enable reliable authentication. 
Noise in the acquired iris image due to intrinsic camera properties can 
be estimated and eliminated by applying a pre-determined de-convolution fil-
ter, thereby, achieving invariance to noise. Noise de-convolution is imple-
mented on the iris image before transforming to the log-polar domain. Howev-
er, effects due to rotation cannot be eliminated as a pre-processing or post-
processing step to image segmentation. Invariance to rotation has to be an in-
trinsic property of the segmentation algorithm itself. Different segmentation 
methods can be explored for this purpose. 
In the work presented in [92], the authors describe a hardware architec-
ture based on Stretch technology to implement segmentation of color images. 
Regions that have fewer pixels can be merged into bigger neighboring regions 
or two or more smaller regions can be merged to form one bigger region. The 
threshold for determining the minimum number of pixels that a region must 
have to exist in the segmented image is chosen appropriately. Since the seg-
mentation algorithm presented in [92] possesses the ability to merge smaller 
regions into bigger regions based on a threshold, it can be made to incorporate 
invariance to rotation. 




implement iris image segmentation. The clustering algorithm produced ex-
tremely reliable segmentation results since the locations of the regions‟ centro-
ids is normalized and the number of regions can be made a constant, „k‟. Also, 
clusters that have similar characteristics of RGB values, but are located at dif-
ferent co-ordinate locations share the same label, enabling effective grouping of 
clusters and rendering invariance to rotation (ranging from 0 to 360 degrees) of 
test image. However, an appropriate choice of „k‟ is very important for reliable 
results. For smaller iris image databases, a smaller value of „k‟ can yield good 
segmentation results (and hence authentication), but as the database size in-
creases the value of „k‟ will eventually increase. The LG graph construction 
presented in this work is based on the segmentation results using the k-means 
clustering algorithm. Fig.5-4. shows the resultant image after segmenting the 
log-polar image using k-means clustering for the R-color space. Similarly the G 
and B color spaces are also segmented. An FPGA implementation of the k-





Fig. 5-4. Segmentation (based on region labeling) of Log-Polar image using k-means 
clustering (R-color space with k = 51) 
5.2.2 Applying LG Graph Methodology 
In this section, we present the LG graph methodology to extract fea-
tures and define relationships between regions in the segmented log-polar 
transformed iris image. The graph is one of the oldest and very powerful me-
thodologies developed for a great variety of the computer science problems. 
The graph method is mainly used to apply spatial constraints to key nodes. 
There are many ways to represent graph. Here we briefly review the ones re-
lated to the representation and recognition of images, objects and their features, 
such as Voronoi Tessellation and Delaunay Graph or graphs with attributes. In 
order to recognize a pattern or model, different techniques have been pro-
posed. Graph editing method is used to compute graph distance and, in turn, 
the graph distance becomes the measure of image similarity. Relational graphs 




ognition. Fu and Sanfeliu used a relational graph to represent characters [101]. 
They proposed descriptive graph grammars as rules to organize and compare 
graphs. There are, however, some common limitations with graph matching 
problem. First, the matching of the model to the data image is node location 
driven. In other words the matching criterion is minimizing the mean square 
over all pixels of the difference between the model and the data image. This 
does not ensure that specific points of interest or landmarks be matched with 
great precision. Second, because of the inherent non-linearity of the problem, 
and the fact that the deformations are high dimensional, the computational 
tools for calculating the match must use relaxation techniques, which runs the 
risk of converging to a local minimum that corresponds to a poor match. 
Our Local-Global (LG) graph method adds local part information into 
graph. The graph is a more accurate representation of an object. Thus, we avoid 
using a non-linear graph matching function. It is wise not to say much, since 
the local and global graphs used here are not new but incremental methodolo-
gies for efficiently representing images via their visible features and the fea-
tures‟ relationships. Thus, here the LG graph is capable of describing with ad-
justable accuracy and robustness the features contained in an iris image. The 
main components of the LG graph are: (i) the local graph that represents the 
information related with size, color, texture and location of the segmented re-
gions and (ii) the global graph that represents the relationships among the 
segmented regions for the entire image. The nodes Pi of the global graph in-




distances between other regions, size and relative magnitude of the segmented 
regions and the orientation of these regions. The local-global image graph 
components, with respect to the segmented log-polar iris image are briefly de-
scribed below. 
The Region or Local Graph L holds information of the log-polar iris im-
age region after segmentation. L is given by: 
L  = N1ac12N2ac23N3 … Nkack1N1  Ni apijNj   …   NnardnmNm …            
where,   represents the graph relationship operator, and each Ni main-
tains the structural features of the corresponding iris regions, i.e.,  Ni = { loca-
tion (l), orientation (o), size (s), texture (t), compactness (c), distance from refer-
ence (d) }, and  each aij holds the relationships among these regions, i.e., aij = { 
relative distance (rd), relative orientation (ro), relative magnitude (rm) }.  
The Global Graph G is also a part of the LG graph by offering addition-
al information about the iris regions and their connectivity. G is given by: 
G = K1ac12K2ac23K3 … KkackqKq  Ki apijKj   …   KnardnmKm … 
where,   represents the graph relationship operator, and each Ki main-
tains the structural features of the corresponding iris region on a global scale. 
Thus, Ki = { location (l), orientation (o), size (s), texture (t), compactness (c), dis-
tance from reference (d) },   and  aij holds the relationships among these regions. 
Thus, aij = { relative distance (rd), relative orientation (ro), relative magnitude 
(rm) }. 
Since texture is one of the features of the segmented iris regions that we 




tors. Methods like the gray-level co-occurrence matrix (GLCM) are not rota-
tionally invariant and hence cannot be used to extract texture features for the 
LG graph. Texture primitives such as mean intensity (mi1), median intensity 
(mi2), mode intensity (mi3), variance (v), standard deviation (sd), entropy (e), 
normalized histogram (nh), skewness (s) and kurtosis (k) are rotationally inva-
riant as well as scale invariant and hence we use these features to extract tex-
tural information from the segmented iris regions. Though, these texture primi-
tives will not be helpful in texture reconstruction, they can hold enough infor-
mation to enable authentication of the iris biometric along with other structural 
features that form the LG graph. 
A database of LG graph representations of the reference (enrolled) iris 
images is created and the LG graph representation of the presented test image 
is compared against this database. Based on a distance metric calculated be-
tween the reference and test LG graphs, the authenticity of the subject is estab-
lished. 
5.2.3 FPGA Synthesis Results 
As mentioned previously, LG graph methodology is a computationally 
intensive process. In order to decrease the time required to establish authentici-
ty of the subject and to eliminate software overhead, we need hardware im-
plementation to accelerate critical sections of the algorithm. FPGA implementa-
tion of compute intensive sections like Hough transformation, image smooth-
ing, log-polar transformation and image segmentation has been addressed be-




fore, in this section, we present the results of reconfigurable implementation 
and mapping of critical sections of the LG graph methodology, i.e., feature ex-
traction and graph comparison, which has not been addressed before. Using 
Matlab/Simulink we are able to rapidly simulate various partitions of the ap-
plications on hardware and software. Matlab/Simulink provides a hardware-
software co-simulation environment where we can execute portions of the ap-
plications as software programs and other portions as customized hardware 
implementation [103]. The hardware-software co-simulation can be further rea-
lized as a hardware-software co-implementation by generating the Hardware 
Description Language and bit-streams for FPGA implementation. The IEEE 
compliant VHDL code is generated using Matlab Simulink blocks and embed-
ded Matlab functions. The FPGA synthesis from the generated VHDL code is 
implemented using Xilinx ISE ver. 9.1i. The target FPGA is Vertex 5, specifical-
ly xc5vlx30.  
We have identified the computationally intensive sections of the LG 
graph methodology as seen in Table 5-1 and we map these sections of the algo-
rithm onto a reconfigurable fabric. Table 5-1, row 1, provides the results of 
FPGA synthesis of the module to calculate a region‟s magnitude. This module 
increments a counter if the supplied pixel label matches the region label, thus 
counting the number of pixels in a given region, i.e., the magnitude of the re-
gion. Table 5-1, row 2, provides the results of FPGA synthesis to calculate the 
mean pixel intensity value in the segmented regions. Since we do not know the 




find the cumulative moving average (CMA) on the FPGA. The CMA is then 
used to update the variance and hence the standard deviation. This online al-
gorithm [102] is as shown further: 
n = 0 
mean = 0 
T = 0 
for each x in data 
  n = n + 1 
delta = x - mean 
   mean = mean + delta/n 
   T = T + delta*(x - mean)      //use new value of mean 
end for 
variance = T/(n - 1) 
std_dev = sqrt(variance) 
 
The „mean‟ and „T‟ values are updated as new pixel values are consi-
dered. This process of updating the average continues till all the pixel values in 
the considered region are exhausted. Variance and standard deviation are then 
calculated using the latest „T‟ value. 
Table 5-1, row 3, provides the FPGA synthesis results to calculate the 
skewness value of pixel intensity distribution. We use a measure of skewness 
as given by Karl Pearson, which is (mean – mode) / standard_deviation. Mode 
can be easily found out by constructing the histogram of the pixel intensities in 
the segmented region. The pixel intensity with maximum frequency in the his-
togram is the mode. 




kurtosis value of pixel intensities of each region. Kurtosis is given the formula 
µ4/σ4, where µ4 is the fourth moment about the mean and σ is the standard 
deviation. 
Table 5-1, row 5 provides the FPGA synthesis results to calculate the en-
tropy. Entropy is given by the formula: 
e = -k Σ pi log (pi) 
where pi is the probability of each pixel intensity. The summation is 
from „n1‟ to „n2‟, where „n1‟ is the minimum pixel intensity and „n2‟ is the max-
imum pixel intensity in the region. The logarithm operation is implemented as 
a Look-up Table and is capable of handling numbers 0 through 65535, which is 
a sufficient range. 
Table 5-1, row 6, provides the FPGA synthesis results to calculate the 
Euclidean distance between the test and reference LG graphs. Euclidean dis-
tance can be used as a distance measure to measure the similarity between the 
reference and test LG graphs.  
Table 5-1. FPGA Synthesis Results (Iris Biometric) 





# Clock Cycles 
1 Region magnitude 75 19,200 4096 
2 
Mean (µ), Variance, Standard Devia-
tion (σ) 
693 19,200 4098 
3 Skewness = (mean – mode) / σ 140 19,200 16 (max) 
4 Kurtosis = µ4/σ4 108 19,200 15 (max) 
5 Entropy 157 19,200 8192 
6 
Euclidean Distance for Feature Com-
parison 
319 19,200 8192 
 




FPGA modules, these modules can be instantiated thrice to process R, G and B 
slices of the considered region in parallel. In this way, three pixel intensities 
can be processed in one clock cycle. Further, the module to calculate the Eucli-
dean distance can be instantiated separately for each feature in consideration, 
thus reducing software overhead and parallelizing the graph comparison oper-
ation. 
5.2.4 Experimental set-up and results 
The iris image database was obtained online from [96]. The database 
consists of 3 x 128 iris images (i.e. 3 x 64 left and 3 x 64 right). The images are 24 
bit - RGB, 576 x 768 pixels and the file format is PNG. The irises were scanned 
by TOPCON TRC50IA optical device connected with SONY DXC-950P 3CCD 
camera. The flow charts for iris biometric enrollment and verification are as 
shown in Fig.5-5. Although, image segmentation is presented as a pre-
processing stage in the previous sections, we show it as a distinct stage in Fig.5-
5 to highlight the criticality of segmentation results in the construction of the 
LG graphs and hence establishing reliable authentication. 
Each localized iris image in the reference set is represented as an LG 
graph as explained in the previous sections and stored in the system database. 
The LG graph representation of input test image is compared against the LG 
graph representation of the reference image in the database. Comparison of the 
LG graphs of the test and reference images is implemented by calculating the 
distance between the two graphs and based on a threshold, the authenticity is 




the set { ε1, ε2, ε3, …. εN }, that are the thresholds for the individual features (e.g., 
RGB values, normalized magnitude of segmented regions, normalized regions‟ 
centroids, normalized regions‟ orientations etc), and „N‟ stands for the number 
of features extracted to form the LG graph representation. The individual fea-
tures can be weighted as needed before thresholding. In our experiments, we 
have weighted all the features equally. The graph pair that produces the mini-
mum distance measure which is within the threshold ε is accepted to be a 
match that establishes the authenticity of the test image. The threshold enables 
us to inculcate slight variations between the reference and test images. Having 
a wider threshold will enable us to accommodate larger variations in the test 
image that may occur due to noise or rotation, but it will also result in the test 
image matching more than one image in the database leading to wrong authen-
tication. A narrow threshold may result in rejection of a valid test image. 
Therefore, the selection of the threshold is critical in determining results of au-
thentication. 
Rotational variations, i.e., 0 to 360 degrees in steps of 10 degrees, were 
introduced in the test images that had a corresponding reference in the data-
base. Although image rotation did not change the result of segmentation (i.e., 
labeling) and graph representation, it changes the location of the regions‟ cen-
troids. To overcome this drawback, we use normalized regions‟ centroids. Var-
iations in scale can be easily handled by normalizing the magnitude of the 
segmented regions. Distances measure like the absolute difference or Euclidean 






Fig. 5-5. Iris biometric enrollment and verification stages 
In our experiments, with rotational variation ranging from 0 to 360 de-
grees, we obtained 92% accuracy in authentication with the following thre-
shold parameters: 
 „k‟ (number of clusters) = 51 
 RGB mean pixel intensity = 2 
 RGB median pixel intensity = 4 
 Variation in magnitude = 5%  
 Variation in the location of regions‟ centroids = 2 pixels  




 Skewness of pixel intensity distribution = 0.2 
 Kurtosis of pixel intensity distribution = 2 
However, we have implemented a very narrow threshold and experi-
mented with a subset of the proposed LG graph features. We believe that the 
accuracy can be further increased by allowing for a slightly relaxed threshold. 
Also, in practical situations, the rotation in the presented iris image will not 
vary between 0 to 360 degrees as we have experimented. Rotational variation 
in practical situations will be around +/- 50 degrees at a maximum and we ob-
tain 100% accuracy in these ranges. 
5.2.5 Conclusion 
In this section, we described a method for LG graph representation of 
the iris image and its application to iris biometric authentication. We presented 
the results of FPGA synthesis of compute intensive sections of the LG graph 
methodology, namely feature extraction and graph comparison as applied to 
iris biometric authentication. The experiments presented in our work are based 
on a limited database of iris images.  Further work in this direction will be to 
experiment using an extensive database of iris images. A detailed analysis of 
the False Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR) is necessary to 
take this preliminary investigation to the next level of full scale implementa-
tion. An analysis of variation in „k‟ (number of clusters) used in the k-means 
clustering algorithm for segmentation, with respect to increase in the size of iris 
image database is necessary. Other rotationally invariant features like Hu Mo-




ture extraction along with the textural primitives that we currently consider. 
Hand optimization of the VHDL code generated using Matlab blocks and em-
bedded functions is required to enhance the performance of the synthesized 
FPGA modules. Cycle accurate simulation is necessary to quantify the tradeoff 
between hardware-software co-implementation and a pure software imple-
mentation. Though not implemented in this work, database encryption is pre-
ferred to address security related issues. 
5.3 LG Graph based Voice Biometric Authentication 
Voice based authentication methodologies are the easiest to implement 
since they do not need a considerable amount of investment on hardware [47]. 
Existing hardware can be used along with required software to implement a 
voice based identification system. Here, we present a text dependent speaker 
verification system in which a predefined utterance by the user is stored in the 
system database. Effectively, spoken language does not matter. Reference and 
test signals are required to have identical wording. Intra-speaker variations are 
induced by the emotional state of the speaker, health and aging whereas inter-
speaker variations are caused by different speaking habits such as rhythm and 
intonation or dialects. 
In this section, we propose a novel FPGA based Local-Global (LG) 
graph methodology [42,48,49] for authenticating the presented speech signal. 
Local features from the reference speech signal, say a spoken password, are 
first extracted and then combined to form a Global graph that is stored in the 




the presented test signal with the Global graph of the stored reference signal. 
The comparison is done by calculating the distance between the two Global 
graphs and based on a threshold, the authenticity is established. The LG graph 
methodology is a computationally intensive process as it involves executing a 
feature extraction algorithm repeatedly over the entire input signal. Further-
more, the comparison of the test and reference signals, if implemented in soft-
ware, will consume expensive clock cycles, thus increasing the authentication 
time. Therefore, a hardware implementation of these critical phases, namely 
feature extraction and graph comparison, is necessary to enable real-time au-
thentication. Although, voice based biometric authentication has been exten-
sively researched, it is still an active research area owing to increasing security 
and privacy concerns in the digital world. In this context, we present the LG 
graph methodology as an incremental methodology for efficiently representing 
speech patterns via their features and the features‟ relationships. 
5.3.1  Pre-processing the Speech Signal 
Prior to comparing the reference and test speech signals, some kind of 
time alignment has to be performed between the two. This aligning is done by 
pre-processing the reference and test speech signals. Pre-processing the speech 
signals eliminates the parts of the speech signal that do not convey any infor-
mation (i.e. silence), before or after the utterance of the speech. Regions of the 
signal that do not convey any information are eliminated using the method of 
standard deviation. The standard deviation of the samples of speech signal is 




dow will not contain enough signal information to be able to measure the de-
sired features, if the window size is too large, the feature values will be aver-
aged over too much, and will lose precision. In our experiments, we found that 
the length of samples retained varied with the size of the window. By trial and 
error, the optimum window size was found to range from 75 to 125 samples. 
The speech signal was padded with the mean value of the windowed signal at 
the beginning and end points of the signal in order to handle boundary prob-
lems. Mean padding was used instead of zero padding because zero padding 
introduces abrupt variations in the signal that are not suitable for the standard 
deviation method used to eliminate sections of no interest in the speech signal. 

































Fig. 5-7. Pre-processed Speech Sample 
The calculated values of the standard deviation are stored in an array. 
The mean value of the stored standard deviation values is calculated and the 
standard deviation values in the array that are less than the calculated mean 
are forced to zero. Re-sampling of the presented speech signal is done based on 
the new standard deviation array. Samples of the speech signal that correspond 
to zero standard deviation are eliminated. Fig. 5-6 and 5-7 show the speech 
sample and its pre-processed version respectively. 
5.3.2 Applying LG Graph Methodology 
Once the alignment is done, the LG graphs of test and reference signals 
can be extracted and compared to each other. For each pair, consisting of a test 
and reference signal, a distance measure, called local distance, is computed. 




length of the signal. The reference speech signal during enrollment is prepro-
cessed as explained in the previous section. After preprocessing, the reference 
signal is represented as an LG graph and stored in the system database. When 
a test speech signal is presented, it is preprocessed using the same technique 
and represented as an LG graph. The LG graph embeds both local information 
(the shape of signal, i.e. parameters of a triangle, stored within the local graph 
at each node) and global information (the topology of the signal). Individual 
features of interest are extracted from the given signal and these features are 
mapped to other extracted features of the signal by finding relations between 
them.  Thus, the LG graph describes the individual features of the signal in re-
lation to the entire signal, thus offering a robust methodology for signal de-
scription and signal comparison. A database of LG graphs can be used to com-
pare and match the LG graphs of test and reference speech signals in order to 





Fig. 5-8. Maxima-Minima detection in a section of the speech signal 
5.3.2.2  Maxima-minima detection 
The first step is to extract the local features by detecting the Maxima 
and Minima points of the signal. This is done by finding the slope of the 
straight line segments that form the signal and identifying points where the 
slope of the signal changes. A maximum is defined as the point on the curve 
where the tangent changes from positive to negative. A minimum is defined as 
the point on a curve where the tangent changes from negative to positive. 
Fig.5-8 shows the maxima and minima detection in a section of the presented 
speech signal. Similarly, maxima and minima points are identified for the en-
tire speech signal. 
5.3.2.3 LG graph representation of the signal 
Once all the maxima and minima in the signal have been identified, the 




two maxima and one minimum) in the given signal. Triangles above the zero x-
axis are formed by two minima and one maximum while triangles below the 
zero x-axis are formed by two maxima and one minimum. This enables us to 
describe the signal in the form of triangles of varying sizes. Figs. 5-9 and 5-10 
show the representation of a given signal in the form of triangles. We also see 
that between the two minima and one maximum (or two maxima and one min-
imum), that form an approximate triangle, there are points where the slope 
changes.  At these points the slope either continues to increase towards the 
maximum (if the point lies on the part of signal that is approaching a maxi-
mum from a minimum) or continues to decrease towards a minimum (if the 
point lies on the part of the signal that is approaching a minimum from a max-
imum). These points, along with the maxima and minima are termed as nodes. 
Precisely, points where the slope of the signal changes, are termed as a nodes 








Fig. 5-9. Nodes in an approximated triangle from a Speech Sample 
 






Fig. 5-11. Formation of Global Graphs in a Speech Sample 
Thus we see that the triangles form approximations of the signal at 
those points. To make this approximation precisely match the given signal, we 
extract features from the nodes that occur in the signal approximated by the 
triangles. The features that are extracted from these nodes are explained fur-
ther. A node given by Ni is represented by: 
Ni = {SPi, EPi, øi, Li} 
Here, Ni stands for the ith  node, SPi stands for the starting point of a 
segment joining Nodei, EPi stands for the ending point of a segment joining 
Nodei, øi stands for the angle between Nodei and the horizontal axis (slope) and 
Li stands for the length of segment joining Nodei.  
The relationship between two nodes is given by αij. αij stands for {*Ni, θij, 
*Nj}, where, Ni and Nj stand for the two consecutive nodes that occur in the sig-




Fig. 5-9 shows the occurrence of the nodes in the signal in the approx-
imated triangles. From the features extracted as described before, we construct 
the Local Graph (Fig.5-10), which is as shown next: 
 
LGi stands for the local graph at the ith node. 
From the Local Graphs obtained from the previous step, we generate 
the global map, which is as shown next: 
 
 
This extracted global map (Fig.5-11) is maintained as a database or can 
be matched with the database to establish the authenticity of the speech signal. 
5.3.3  FPGA Synthesis Results 
In this section, we present the results of FPGA synthesis for the critical 
phases of the feature extraction and comparison methodology. The computa-
tionally intensive phases of the LG graph methodology, namely feature extrac-
tion and graph comparison, are mapped to reconfigurable hardware. Using 
Matlab/Simulink we are able to rapidly simulate various partitions of the ap-
plication on hardware and software. Matlab Simulink provides a hardware-
software co-simulation environment where we can execute portions of the ap-
plications as software programs and other portions as customized hardware 
implementation [103]. The hardware-software co-simulation can be further rea-
lized as a hardware-software co-implementation by generating the Hardware 
Description Language and bit-streams for FPGA implementation. The IEEE 
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compliant VHDL code is generated using Matlab/Simulink blocks and embed-
ded Matlab functions. The FPGA synthesis from the generated VHDL code is 
implemented using Xilinx ISE ver. 9.1i. The target FPGA is Vertex 5, specifical-
ly xc5vlx30. We have identified the computationally intensive sections of the 
LG graph methodology as seen in Table 1 to 4 and we map these sections of the 
algorithm onto a reconfigurable fabric. 
Table.5-2. presents the results for the FGPA synthesis of the module to 
find the derivative, i.e. Δx / Δy, at any given point in the speech signal. Ta-
ble.5-3. presents the results for the FGPA synthesis of the module to find the 
area occupied by each triangular representation of the signal. In case the trian-
gular representation of the signal has more than three nodes as seen in Fig.5-9, 
the total area occupied is approximated by the sum of the areas of different 
trapezoids that approximate the triangle. Table.5-4. presents the results of the 
FPGA synthesis for the module to find the midpoint of a line segment. Table.5-
5. presents the results of FPGA synthesis for the module to find the Euclidean 
distance. The Euclidean distance module is used to find (1) the height of the 
triangle, i.e. distance from peak to midpoint of base, (2) the length of segments 
of the triangle and (3) to compare reference and test patterns. Since the LG 
graph of the test signal is compared with the LG graph of the reference signal 
in the database, hardware implementation of the comparison module is neces-
sary to speed-up the authentication process. In an ideal case, for a voice biome-
tric of „n‟ samples, we extract (n-2) triangles, (n-2) midpoints, (2n-3) derivatives 




number of clock cycles are specific to a voice biometric consisting of 65535 
samples, which will vary if the number of samples differ. 
Table 5-2. FPGA Synthesis Results to find the Derivative (Voice Biometric) 






# Clock Cycles 
Module to find: 
 Δx and Δy 
64 19,200 262134 
Module to find: 
 Δx / Δy 
108 19,200 1966005 
 
**The occurrence of a trapezoid is not an ideal case. For ease of understanding, in Table 2, 
we present the number of clock cycles to find the area of a single trapezoid region. 
Table 5-3. FPGA Synthesis Results to find the Area (Voice Biometric) 






# Clock Cycles 
Module to find: 
area of triangle 
37 19,200 262132 
**Module to find: 
 area of trapezoid 
69 19,200 6 
 
Table 5-4. FPGA Synthesis Results to find the Mid-point (Voice Biometric) 
Module to find  Mid-





# Clock Cycles 
Module to find: 
Mid-point 
32 19,200 131066 
 
Table 5-5. FPGA Synthesis Results to find the Euclidean Distance (Voice Biometric) 






# Clock Cycles per 
Feature 
Module to find:     
(x1-x2)2+ (y1-y1)2 
139 19,200 458731 
Module to find: 
Square- root(32 bit) 





5.3.4 Experimental Set-Up and results 
5.3.4.1 Database used 
The voice biometric database was provided by Quantum Signal LLC. 
The database used consists of utterances from 20 people. Two samples were 
obtained from each person, one to construct the reference LG graph and one for 
testing purpose. Therefore a total of 40 samples were obtained. Each utterance 
consisted of words specific to the person, like a password. All the audio sam-
ples are 44.1 kHz, 16-bit mono PCM WAV data. They were recorded using a 
Shure microphone. 
5.3.4.2 Feature extraction and storage 
Each utterance from the reference set is represented as an LG graph. 
The speech signal is first pre-processed and features are extracted based on the 
LG graph methodology. The extracted features enable us to describe the signal 
in the form of triangles as described previously. Since, we do not store the ac-
tual voice, but an LG graph representation of the voice, the user need not wor-
ry about his or her voice recording being compromised. Though not imple-
mented in the current system, encryption of the database is preferred to ad-
dress issues related to security. 
5.3.4.3 Comparison for authentication 
The LG graph representation of the input test signal is compared 
against the stored LG graph representation of the reference signal database. 
Comparison of the LG graphs of test and reference signals is done by calculat-




thenticity is established. The threshold ε is determined experimentally and is 
defined by the set { ε1, ε2, ε3, …. εN }, that are the thresholds for the individual 
features, and „N‟ stands for the number of features extracted to form the LG 
graph representation. The graph pair that produces the minimum distance 
measure which is within the threshold ε is accepted to be a match to establish 
the authenticity of the test signal. The distance measure is calculated per fea-
ture vector per pattern, i.e., the triangular representation of the speech signal.  
Along with a match of the feature vectors of reference and test signals, 
the location of the pattern in the two signals must also match. Based on these 
criteria, the test signal is verified for authenticity. Since we are working in the 
time domain, dynamic time warping is used to align the extracted feature vec-
tors corresponding to reference and test speech signals. The flow charts for 





Fig. 5-12. Voice Biometric Enrollment and Verification Stages 
5.3.4.4 Dynamic time warping 
Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) allows a non-linear mapping of one 
signal to another by minimizing the distance between the two. This means that 
two time series that are similar but locally out of phase can be aligned in a non-
linear manner. In spite of its O(n2) time complexity, DTW is the best solution 
known for time series problems in a variety of domains like speech processing, 
data mining, pattern matching etc [50]. In our work, we use DTW to align the 
extracted reference and test feature vectors to produce the minimum distance 
possible for the purpose of authentication. 
5.3.4.5 Results of implementation 




program, written in Matlab, is interactive and prompts the user through a se-
ries of steps to establish authenticity. The threshold ε is pre-determined expe-
rimentally, and is hard-coded in the program. Distance measures based on ab-
solute difference and Euclidean distance were also considered in our experi-
mentation. The choice of distance measure was found to govern the value of 
the threshold ε. A relaxed threshold may result in misclassification of the test 
signal while a very conservative threshold may result in rejection of a genuine 
test signal. Since the claim of identity is assumed prior to verification of the 
speaker, the accuracy is increased while reducing the search space by eliminat-
ing search through the entire database and thus decreasing time taken for 
comparison.  
For the purpose of experimentation, area and height features were cal-
culated from the triangular representations of reference and test speech signals. 
Fig.5-13 shows the minimum distances between reference and test samples for 
the area feature vector. Fig. 5-14 shows the minimum distances between refer-
ence and test samples for the height feature vector. Each set (1 to 20) consists of 
a pair of speech samples, i.e., a reference and a test speech sample. For exam-
ple, in Fig.5-13, column against set 1 corresponds to the distance between the 
area feature vectors of reference and test samples in set 1. Similarly, in Fig. 5-
14, the column against set 10 corresponds to the distance between the height 
feature vectors of reference and test samples in set 10. Depending on the thre-
shold value , the accuracy is established. Since we are minimizing the distance, 




while feature vectors that produce a minimum distance are considered an ac-
ceptable match.  
 
Fig. 5-13. Minimizing  distance between reference & test sample for “area” feature (thre-
shold at 15) 
For example, in Fig 5-13 and 5-14, having a threshold at 75% results in 
an accuracy of 90%. This means a threshold value of 15 (75% of 20) for the area 
feature vector distance and a threshold value of 22.5 (75% of 30) for the height 
feature vector distance results in 90% accuracy in authentication. All the values 
less than the threshold are accepted as a match while values greater than the 
threshold are rejected. 
 
Fig. 5-14. Minimizing distance between  reference & test sample for “height”  feature 
(threshold at 22.5) 
In order to gain further insight, we compared the performance of our 




Fig.5-15 shows the results of maximizing correlation between test and reference 
signals from the same database. The correlation values shown are normalized. 
A correlation value of 1.0 is considered as a perfect match. In this case, a thre-
shold on correlation is set up such that signals with maximum correlation are 
considered an acceptable match while signals that produce lesser correlation 
values are considered to be a mismatch. In Fig.5-15 below, having a threshold 
at 75% will result in an authentication accuracy of 85%. All the values lesser 
than the threshold are rejected while values greater than the threshold are ac-
cepted as match. Thus we observe that the LG graph methodology is not only 
comparable in performance to a classic FFT based correlation technique for pat-
tern recognition but also has better accuracy. 
 
Fig. 5-15. Maximizing correlation values between reference & test samples 
5.3.5 Conclusion 
In this section, we described a method for LG graph representation of 
the speech signal and its application to authentication. We presented the results 
of the FPGA synthesis of the computationally intensive phases of the metho-
dology, namely feature extraction and graph comparison. We also presented 




pared the results to a correlation based technique. Experimentally, we observed 
that the LG graph methodology is more accurate when compared to the FFT 
based correlation technique. The FPGA implementation of the critical phases of 
the LG graph methodology is necessary to reduce the software overhead while 
increasing speed. 
Future work includes experimenting using an extensive database com-
posed of more complex speech patterns. A detailed analysis of the False Accep-
tance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR) is necessary to take this pre-
liminary investigation to the next level of full scale implementation. Manual 
optimization of the VHDL code generated using Matlab Simulink blocks and 
embedded functions is necessary to enhance performance of the synthesized 
FPGA modules. A cycle accurate simulation is necessary to quantify the tra-
deoff between hardware-software co-implementation and a pure software im-
plementation. Furthermore, an encryption of the database would be preferred 
to address security related issues. 
5.4 LG Graph based Fingerprint Biometric Authentication 
Fingerprint biometrics is by far the most widely deployed identification 
and authentication technique. Most of the fingerprint based biometric authenti-
cation schemes either rely on minutiae information or on ridge information to 
establish authenticity of the subject. Invariance to elastic distortion during fin-
gerprint matching is an open problem that has not been completely addressed 
by these methodologies. In this direction, we offer a unique Local-Global (LG) 




age. The LG graph methodology seeks to combine the minutiae information 
with the ridge feature information to enhance the robustness and reliability of 
the fingerprint matching process. Features from the individual ridges in the 
pre-processed fingerprint image are first extracted to represent the local graph. 
The individual ridges are also referred to as regions and used interchangeably 
in this paper. The local information extracted from these regions includes re-
gion starting, region ending, ridge bifurcation and region centroid. Euclidean 
distances between the individual regions‟ centroids is calculated and 
represented as a distance matrix to form the global graph. Thus, a combination 
of the local information combined with the global distance matrix yields the LG 
graph representation of the fingerprint image. This LG graph representation of 
the reference or enrolled fingerprint image is stored in a database. For subject 
verification, an LG graph is extracted from the presented test fingerprint image 
and compared with the corresponding LG graph in the database. Comparison 
is achieved by calculating the absolute difference between the two graphs and 
based on a threshold, the authenticity of the subject is established. 
The database used in our experiments was obtained online from [44]. 
The fingerprints were synthetically generated by using SFinGe [45]. The image 
size is 240x320 pixels, and 8 bit depth.  The parameters of the synthetic genera-
tor were tuned to emulate a low-cost sensor with a small acquisition area. 
5.4.1 Pre-processing the Fingerprint Image 
The LG graph methodology relies on successful extraction of the indi-




to extraction of the LG graph from the fingerprint image. The important steps 
in pre-processing include image binarization, skeletonization and elimination 
of spurious regions. The acquired fingerprint image has a bi-modal histogram 
as seen in Fig.5-16. Hence it is easy to set up a hard threshold to binarize and 
generate a negative of the acquired image. 
 
Fig. 5-16. Bi-modal histogram of the synthetic fingerprint image 
Fig.5-17(a) shows the acquired fingerprint image and Fig.5-17(b) shows 
the binarized negative of the acquired fingerprint image. The next step is to 
skeletonize the binary image and eliminate spurious regions. This is achieved 
by implementing an “OPEN” operation on the binary image followed by thin-
ning operation. “OPEN” operation reduces false minutiae while making sure 
that previously unconnected regions remain unconnected. The result of skele-
tonization operation on Fig.5-17(b) is shown in Fig.5-18(a). We then apply con-
nected component labeling algorithm with 8-neighbor connectivity to isolate 




determined threshold, thus eliminating spurious regions. This resultant image 
is as shown in Fig.5-18(b). After this pre-processing of the fingerprint image is 
completed, the LG graph is then extracted from the pre-processed image. 
 
                                (a)                          (b) 
Fig. 5-17. (a) Sample synthetic fingerprint image (b) Binarizing the fingerprint image to 
obtain its negative 
 
                                (a)                          (b) 




5.4.2 Applying LG Graph Methodology 
The graph is a more accurate representation of an object. The LG graph 
offers an incremental methodology for efficiently representing images via their 
visible features and the features‟ relationships. The LG graph embeds both the 
local information, i.e., region description, and the global information, i.e., the 
topology of the image. Thus, here the LG graph is capable of describing the fea-
tures contained in the fingerprint image. 
The main components of the LG graph are: (i) the local graph that 
represents the information related with region magnitude, region centroid, 
ridge bifurcation, ridge ending points, ridge starting points, local distance ma-
trix and (ii) the global graph that represents the relationships among the differ-
ent regions for the entire image (global distance matrix). The local and global 
distance matrices consist of Euclidean distances between the features of inter-
est. The local-global image graph components, with respect to the preprocessed 
fingerprint image are briefly described below. 
The Region or Local Graph L holds information of the fingerprint 
ridges (or regions). L is given by: 
L  = N1ac12N2ac23N3 … Nkack1N1  Ni apijNj  … NnardnmNm … 
where,   represents the graph relationship operator, and each Ni maintains 
the structural features of the corresponding fingerprint ridges, i.e.,  Ni = { loca-
tion (l), orientation (o), magnitude (m), ridge centroid (rc), ridge starting point 
(rsp), ridge ending point (rep), ridge bifurcation points (rbp), number of bifur-




among these regions, i.e., aij = { relative distance (rd), relative orientation (ro), 
relative magnitude (rm) }.  
The Global Graph G is also a part of the LG graph by offering addition-
al information about the fingerprint regions and their connectivity. G is given 
by: 
G = K1ac12K2ac23K3 … KkackqKq  Ki apijKj  …  KnardnmKm … 
where,   represents the graph relationship operator, and each Ki maintains the 
structural features of the corresponding fingerprint region on a global scale. 
Thus, Ki = { location (l), orientation (o), magnitude (m), ridge centroid (rc), 
ridge starting point (rsp), ridge ending point (rep), ridge bifurcation points 
(rbp), number of bifurcations (nb), global distance matrix (gdm) },   and  aij 
holds the relationships among these regions. Thus, aij = { relative distance (rd), 
relative orientation (ro), relative magnitude (rm) }.  
The ridge starting and ending points are discovered using the hit-or-
miss structuring elements. These structuring elements traverse the fingerprint 
image in a raster scan and identify the ridge starting and ending points, based 
on matching the patterns as depicted in Fig.5-19. The 8 structuring elements 
account for the 8 neighbors to the pixel in consideration, thus identifying the 





Fig. 5-19. Hit or Miss structuring elements to identify ridge ending/starting points 
Similarly, the ridge bifurcations are also discovered using the hit-or-
miss structuring elements. These structuring elements traverse the fingerprint 
image in a raster scan and identify the ridge bifurcations, based on matching 
the 8 patterns as depicted in Fig.5-20.  
 
Fig. 5-20. Hit or Miss (x - don’t care) structuring elements to identify ridge end-
ing/starting points    
Individual regions (or ridges) can be isolated by using the connected 
component labeling technique using the 8 neighbor connectivity as explained 
before. A region‟s centroid is calculated by averaging the region‟s pixel posi-
tions. The region (or ridge) centroid calculated by averaging its pixel positions 




gion. Therefore, the calculated centroid is projected back into the region (or 
ridge) by choosing a point on the ridge having the least Euclidean distance 
from the calculated centroid. The point on the ridge with the least Euclidean 
distance from the calculated centroid is chosen as the ridge (or region) centroid. 
Fig.5-21 shows an isolated region, its corresponding region centroid and its 
starting and ending points. Fig.5-22 shows the centroids of all the different re-
gions. 
 
Fig. 5-21. Isolation of a single ridge, its centroid, its end and start points 
A local distance matrix is computed based on the Euclidean distances 
between the region‟s centroid and its corresponding starting, ending and re-
gion bifurcation points. The magnitude of the region is obtained by counting 
the number of pixels in the region. The regions are then ranked based on their 
magnitude in descending order and a Euclidean distance matrix is calculated 
based on the location of the regions‟ centroids. The distance matrix represents 
the relative distances between different regions on a global scale. Fig.5-23 
shows the Global graph that connects all the regions‟ centroids. Fig. 5-23 is 




The relative magnitude can be obtained by dividing all the regions‟ magnitude 
values by the magnitude value of the biggest region. 
  
Fig. 5-22. Centroids of different regions (centroids highlighted as squares) 
                    
Fig. 5-23. Connecting the centroids to form a Global graph 




tively combine the local minutiae features with the corresponding ridge de-
scription and map them on a global scale to enable a robust representation of 
the fingerprint image for the purpose of authentication. 
5.4.3 LG Graph Comparison 
During enrollment, the fingerprint image of the subject is pre-
processed, represented as an LG graph and stored in the system database as a 
reference. For verification, the subject‟s fingerprint image is pre-processed, 
represented as an LG graph and compared against the corresponding reference 
LG graph in the database. The reference LG graph corresponds to the identity 
claimed by the subject. Comparison is implemented by calculating the absolute 
difference between the two graphs and based on a threshold, the authenticity is 
established.  
This threshold, ε is determined experimentally and is defined by the set 
{ ε1, ε2, ε3, …. εN }, that are the thresholds for the individual features (e.g., nor-
malized magnitude of regions, local distance matrix for the corresponding re-
gion, global distance matrix, etc), and „N‟ stands for the number of features ex-
tracted to form the LG graph representation. As mentioned previously, the lo-
cal and global distance matrices consist of the Euclidean distances between the 
features of interest. The graph pair that produces the minimum distance meas-
ure, i.e., minimum sum of absolute differences between the two graphs, that is 
within the threshold ε is accepted to be a match that establishes the authenticity 
of the test image, thus verifying the subject. The threshold enables us to ac-




threshold can accommodate larger variations in the test image that may occur 
due to elastic distortion, but may also result in wrong authentication. A narrow 
threshold may result in rejection of a valid test image. Therefore, the selection 
of the threshold is critical in determining results of authentication. Though the 
LG graph is capable of describing the fingerprint image using all the features 
mentioned in Section.3, in our experiments, we currently compare the global 
distance matrices and the local distance matrices of the test and reference fin-
gerprint images to enable authentication. The local distance matrices are com-
puted for each ridge by calculating the Euclidean distances from the region‟s 
centroid to the ridge starting, ending and bifurcation points. The global dis-
tance matrix is computed for all the ridges by calculating the Euclidean dis-
tances between the regions‟ centroids. 
5.4.4 FPGA Synthesis Results 
In order to decrease the time required to establish authenticity of the 
subject and to eliminate software overhead, we need hardware implementation 
to accelerate critical sections of the algorithm. The most compute intensive sec-
tion of our LG graph methodology is the hit-or-miss operation to identify the 
ridge ending, ridge starting and ridge bifurcations. The implementation of 
these structuring elements can be parallelized and implemented on reconfigur-
able logic to improve the performance of the methodology. The algorithm is 
implemented using Matlab/Simulink, using which we are able to rapidly si-
mulate the application as hardware-software portions. Matlab/Simulink pro-




portions of the applications as software programs and other portions as custo-
mized hardware implementation [103]. The IEEE compliant VHDL code is gen-
erated using Matlab Simulink blocks and embedded Matlab functions. The 
FPGA synthesis from the generated VHDL code is implemented using Xilinx 
ISE ver. 9.1i. The target FPGA is Vertex 5, specifically xc5vlx30.  
Table.5-6. presents the results of FPGA synthesis for the module to im-
plement the hit-or-miss operation to identify the ridge end, start and bifurca-
tions. All the 16 structuring elements depicted in Fig. 5-19 and 5-20 are imple-
mented in parallel for each pixel in consideration. The nine pixels in the 3x3 
structuring element (8 neighbors + pixel in consideration) are buffered and fed 
to the FPGA module. The 16 binary output values are either 1, if there is a 
match for the structuring element, or 0, if there is no match. The center pixel 
position in the 3x3 window corresponding to the matching structuring element 
is buffered, tagged as start, end or bifurcation point and stored in the LG 
graph. The total number of clock cycles to implement this operation will be 
76800, since the size of the image is 240x320 pixels, and the 16 hit-or-miss oper-
ations will consume 1 clock cycle when implemented in parallel. The boundary 
extension of the image will be handled by zero padding. 
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5.4.5 Testing the LG Graph Methodology 
To enable robust and reliable authentication, the LG graph methodolo-
gy has to exhibit invariance to scaling, translational and rotational effects in the 
test fingerprint image as compared to its corresponding reference fingerprint 
image. But in our case, scaling and translational effects are not considered be-
cause it is not inherent in the fingerprint image acquisition process. However 
we have to test for rotational invariance within permissible limits. 
In order to test our methodology for rotational invariance, rotational 
variations equal to +/- 15 degrees in steps of 1 degree, were introduced in the 
test images that had a corresponding reference in the database. Rotation great-
er than +/- 15 degrees may result in loss of information because the fingerprint 
acquisition system may not be able to completely and correctly scan the finger 
to generate the necessary image. Although image rotation does not change the 
result of ridge extraction and graph representation, it changes the location of 
the regions‟ centroids. The LG graph methodology is invariant to rotation be-
cause we consider relative Euclidean distances between the different ridges‟ 
centroids and not the pixel co-ordinates of the regions‟ centroids to construct 
the global distance matrix. Also, the local graph corresponding to each ridge or 
region is computed as a Euclidean distance matrix between the region‟s centro-
id and its corresponding ridge start, end and bifurcation points. Thus, the local 
distance matrix contains only the relative distances and not the pixel co-
ordinates. Further, we rank the regions based on their magnitude in descend-




gions rotationally invariant, since distances between regions are calculated 
based on their magnitude, with the biggest region as a reference, as opposed to 
calculating distances based solely on the location of the regions' centroids.  
In our experiments, with rotational variation ranging from -15 to +15 
degrees, we obtained 100% accuracy in authentication. It is to be noted that 
100% authentication results are based on the fact that the acquired fingerprint 
image undergoes ideal preprocessing with ideal extraction of the individual 
ridges. The extraction of the individual ridges is independent of rotation in-
volved but is heavily dependent on distortion due to noise. Distortion due to 
noise may give rise to false minutiae or improper ridge isolation, i.e., two or 
more ridges being connected as one region, which ultimately leads to wrong 
authentication results.  
Fig.5-24. shows the various stages in fingerprint enrollment and verifi-





Fig. 5-24. Fingerprint Biometric Enrollment and Verification Stages 
5.4.6 Conclusion 
In this article, we described a method for LG graph representation of 
the fingerprint image and its application to fingerprint biometric authentica-
tion. We presented the results of FPGA synthesis of compute intensive sections 
of the LG graph methodology, namely identification of ridge start, end and bi-
furcations as applied to fingerprint biometric authentication. The experiments 
presented in our work are based on a limited database of synthetic fingerprint 
images.  Further work in this direction will be to experiment using an extensive 




Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR). Statistics of loops, 
arches and whorls can also be used along with the presented ridge attributes to 
better describe the fingerprint biometric for the purpose of LG graph construc-
tion. Cycle accurate simulation is necessary to quantify the tradeoff between 
hardware-software co-implementation and a pure software implementation. 
Though not implemented in this work, database encryption is preferred to ad-
dress security related issues. 
5.5 Performance Analysis 
Biometric algorithms, implemented using C/C++ or any high level lan-
guages are similar to the Simulated Benchmark Programs (SBPs) presented in 
Section 3.3.7. The biometric algorithms will essentially be comprised of multip-
lication, division, addition and subtraction operations as seen in the SBPs. 
Therefore the performance analysis of the biometric algorithms will yield re-
sults similar to the SBPs presented in Section 3.3.7. We observe an increase in 
CPI due to SCAN encryption and decryption of instructions and data. The per-
centage increase in CPI due to SCAN encryption is around 52% for the SBPs 










6 CHAPTER SIX 
This dissertation work describes research related to the design and per-
formance analysis of a secure processor SCAN-SP with crypto-biometric capa-
bilities. This chapter summarizes the contributions made in this dissertation 
and provides directions for possible future work.  
6.1 Contributions 
In the course of this research work, several contributions were made as 
listed below: 
1. A survey on secure processor architectures in the industry and in 
the academia as described in Chapter 2. 
2. Enhancement of the SparcV8 processor architecture to incorporate 
pipelined decryption and encryption of instructions and data, along 
with compiler modifications to enable random number generator 
seed management and SCAN key management as described in 
Chapter 3. 
3. Design and synthesis of FPGA to accelerate computationally inten-
sive sections of the SCAN encryption, information hiding and com-
pression algorithms, along with a new instruction set to interface 
the cryptographic FPGA with the SparcV8 architecture also de-
scribed in Chapter 3. 




tication techniques based on Neural Networks described in chapter 
4. 
5. Development of Local-Global graph methodology based algorithms 
to enable voice, iris and fingerprint based biometric authentication, 
FPGA synthesis of computationally intensive sections of the algo-
rithms and a new instruction set to interface the biometric FPGA 
with the SparcV8 architecture as described in Chapter 5. 
6.2 Future Work 
As demonstrated in this work, the proposed secure processor architec-
ture is a feasible approach to enable secure computing. SCAN-Secure Processor 
can be effectively implemented to secure data and code in an embedded envi-
ronment. Alternatively, it can also be implemented to secure networking 
nodes. Biometric authentication capabilities of the SCAN-SP make it a viable 
solution that can be incorporated in various access control and security applica-
tions. Mobile products like cell phones that enable secure transactions like mo-
bile banking can benefit by incorporating the SCAN-SP as the processing unit. 
Further work in this direction can involve exploring a single chip ASIC 
solution where the microcontroller core and the crypto-engine are integrated to 
avoid concerns relating to the security of the co-processor and eliminate delay 
in data transfer. Physical mechanism to erase RNG seeds and SCAN key due to 
tampering needs to be further explored, which will be a part of actual chip 
packaging. Multi-modal biometrics can also be explored in order to provide 




vulnerability analysis of the SCAN-Secure Processor is necessary in order to 
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